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summary  
This report focuses on the five new states of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan), and draws some parallels between these states and Mongolia, 
although the latter enjoys a very distinct history.  
Central Asia is an area that does not divide nicely into regime successes and regime failures, 
either with regard to economic and social rights or as relates to civil and political rights. At the 
same time, though, it is possible to argue persuasively that some states have done better than 
have others.  
We will look at states where economic and social as well as civil and political rights have been 
advanced. Our primary example in this category will be Kazakhstan. We recognize, though, that 
Kazakhstan has made very uneven strides toward building a democracy, and that it is not the most 
democratic state in the region. However, as our analysis will show, it is a state in which there has 
been a comprehensive overhaul of the political and economic system, and these developments are 
likely to be sustainable.  
Our report will also examine states where there has been a reversal in social and economic 
development while there has been progress in social and political rights. Our prime example here 
will be Kyrgyzstan, although we recognize that it does not fit nicely into either the first or the second 
category. Kyrgyzstan has made vast strides in terms of development of democratic political 
institutions, and has done so in an atmosphere which has generally been very supportive of 
individual human rights.  
Finally, we will look at states in which there has been a reversal of economic, social, civil and 
political rights. Uzbekistan is a state which is a good example of this. Again, though, the case is not 
a clear-cut one. There is no question that political and civil rights have come under threat and been 
curtailed in Uzbekistan in recent years, and that economic reforms have been introduced quite 
slowly, and without significantly expanding the economic rights of the population. At the same time, 
Uzbekistan has worked hard to maintain a wide range of social welfare benefits, and has 
oftentimes used their commitment to this goal as a partial explanation for way economic reforms 
are being held up.  
An Overview of the Region  
Much attention has been recently focused on Central Asia, a region that President Nazarbayev of 
Kazakhstan frequently calls a "bridge between Europe and Asia." Its territory is 3.9 million square 
kilometers, which is comparable in size to Western Europe, however, Central Asia's total 
population of 55.6 million is about 7 times smaller than that of Europe. The region is of geostrategic 
importance not only because of its location but also because of what it has to offer. The area has 
valuable natural resources including major deposits of oil, natural gas, coal, iron ore, gold, silver, 
uranium, and others.  This has provided handsome motivation for many rulers to try and dominate the region. Persians, 
Greeks, Chinese, Turks, Arabs, and Mongols have all flexed their muscles in what is now Central 
Asia. The region's borders were defined first by the outcome of the Russian-British "Great Game" 
and later by the Soviet Union. Russian military began to explore the Kazakh steppes in the early 
18th century under Peter the Great and by the middle of the 19th century Kazakhstan fell under 
Russia's control. By 1900 the conquest of Turkestan and eastern Pamirs was complete.  
When the Bolsheviks came to power in October 1917, they proclaimed the right of nations to self-
determination, but fought a nearly decade long civil war to retain control of the region. The Soviets 
termed this opposition the Basmachi (or brigands) revolt, while the Central Asians referred to it as 
the Freemen's Movement. As early as 1920 Lenin concluded that the "political map" of Turkestan 
needed to include three primary units, "Uzbekia, Kirgizia, and Turkmenia."1 The region was 
arbitrarily redistricted in 1924 and those communities that supported Basmachi's revolt against the 
Bolsheviks were moved across new administrative borders in an attempt to uproot them. Sporadic 
resistance continued until the mid-1930s. By 1940 five republics, the Tajik, Turkmen, Kazakh, 
Kyrgyz, and Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republics, had all been created.  
The Soviet experience completely shaped the economic development of these five states. Until the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, these republics had gone through forced 
"nationalization, collectivization, and industrialization" but their economic development had largely 
been designed to maximize their potential as exporters of raw mineral and agricultural materials  
The economies of the five were designed to maximize their contributions to the metropol. In 1989 
Kazakhstan accounted for 20 percent of the total Soviet coal production; Kyrgyzstan was a leading 
producer of uranium, Tajikistan a major producer of hydroelectric power, and Uzbekistan was the 
world's fourth largest producer of cotton and its third largest exporter, the third largest producer of 
natural gas in the former Soviet Union.2  
In 1986 Central Asia had the lowest per capita industrial output in the country.3 A large part of the 
existing industrial production, such as for example, oil refining, heavy metallurgy, and 
petrochemical production in Kazakhstan, was based on the rich natural resources. Machinery and 
heavy equipment produced in Uzbekistan was used for cotton cultivation, harvesting, and 
processing, while Kyrgyzstan produced agricultural machinery and exported sheep products and 
some gold. The region's natural resources were largely processed and refined in the European part 
of the Soviet Union. For example, while Central Asia produced about nine-tenths of the Soviet 
cotton output, it accounted for just 5 percent of the country's textiles.4 As a result, the countries of 
Central Asia were not truly industrialized or self-sufficient and were dependent on the Soviet 
distribution system for both goods and transfers.5  
This pattern of economic development had unavoidable social implications. The Central Asian 
republics had the lowest levels of income per capita among the Soviet republics save Azerbaijan. 
In general, these countries had the lowest per-capita consumption spending, highest birth rates,6 
higher than average unemployment rates, the least living space, the worst living conditions, the 
fewest doctors, the largest families, the shortest life expectances, and the highest levels of infant 
mortality. With an exception of Kazakhstan, all of the Central Asian republics had above average 
expenditures on food and below average savings.7  The region also fell victim to the Russian and Soviet nationality policies, which among other things 
dramatically changed the demographic portrait of society. Ethnic Russians and Ukrainians were 
encouraged to move into Central Asia beginning in the second half of the 19th century to farm what 
the colonial rulers termed "surplus" lands. At the same time more than a half million Kyrgyz and 
Kazakhs were deported from the region in the aftermath of the 1916 uprising when they protested 
conscription in forced labor brigades during World War I.  
Later a similar policy was used by Stalin to punish peoples he suspected to be "unfaithful," such as 
the Crimean Tatars, the Volga Germans, and the Chechens. For example, in 1989 about half of the 
total Crimean Tatar population lived in Uzbekistan.8 During 1950s, in an attempt to increase 
agricultural production, thousands of Russians and other Europeans moved to Kazakhstan to make 
the so-called Virgin Lands suitable for agricultural production. As a result of these policies each 
Central Asian state became a multi-ethnic entity, and at the time of independence ethnic Russians 
accounted for a third of the population of Kazakhstan, and a fifth of the population of Kyrgyzstan.  
The Soviet policies of social engineering also had some positive aspects. As a result, all of these 
republics began their lives as independent states with a comprehensive albeit flawed social welfare 
net in place. The Soviet Union provided a system of social guarantees that included 
comprehensive health care and educational systems, as well as a well-developed pension system. 
They introduced universal literacy and opened many new schools and the right to secondary 
education was on average guaranteed. Health-care though was of diminishing quality, and 
education was skewed to favor graduates of Russian language schools.  
Despite the fact that the five post-Soviet states were very similar, all with the same package of 
individual social and economic guarantees, their starting points as independent states were still 
quite different. Historically, Uzbeks and Tajiks were settled peoples while (like the Mongolians) the 
Kazakhs and Kyrgyz were nomads and this continued to manifest itself in the way of life. During 
the Soviet times, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were largely agricultural republics, where industry 
accounted for a smaller share of the labor force than did agriculture. Kazakhstan was by far the 
most industrialized of the Central Asian states. It is not surprising that it had the highest percentage 
among all Central Asian states of labor force employed by the state. Kazakhstan was also the only 
non-Slavic post-Soviet republic to have inherited nuclear weapons.  
Kazakhstan was the third largest republic of the former Soviet Union and is almost as big as all of 
Western Europe. Because of its size it has the second lowest population density among the 
Central Asian states, with just 5.7 people per square kilometer. About two thirds of the neighboring 
Uzbekistan's territory consists of steppe, desert, and semi-arid terrain. It has the largest population 
among the Central Asian states and was the Soviet Union's third most populous republic. Its 
Ferghana valley is one of the most heavily populated areas in the world with more than 300 
persons per square kilometer, with the Andijan oblast having up to 427 persons per square 
kilometer.9 Kyrgyzstan is a small landlocked country that is not well endowed with mineral 
resources and is surrounded by much bigger neighbors.  
Ethnic composition also varied from country to country. By the time of independence Kazakhs 
accounted for 36 percent of the population of Kazakhstan (57.1 percent in 1926) and Kyrgyz for 
52.4 percent of the population of Kyrgyzstan (66.8 percent in 1926). Kazakhstan was the only post-Soviet country in which titular nation was not a clear majority. Thirty nine percent of the population 
was Russian and that caused a certain degree of nervousness in Kazakhstan that shares an over 
6,000 kilometer long border with Russia. Approximately one third of the population of Kyrgyzstan 
lives in the south of the country. In the south, Uzbeks account for 28.1 percent of the population. It 
was a site of an ethnic conflict that erupted in 1990 in the Osh oblast over what was perceived as 
an unfair distribution of land between the local Uzbeks and the Kyrgyz.10 The situation was more 
homogenous in Tajikistan where at the time of independence Tajiks accounted for 64.9 percent of 
the population (74.8 in 1926), in Turkmenistan where Turkmen accounted for 73.3 percent (73.8 in 
1926), and in Uzbekistan, where Uzbeks accounted for 71.4 percent of the total population (75.4 in 
1926).11 Mongolia is an ethnically homogeneous country with Khalkha Mongols accounting for 90 
percent of the population.  
By 1990 all of the countries in the region found their economies to be in complete disarray with 
rising prices, plummeting production, and monetary emission. Independence was desired but 
unexpected to all of these countries. It is not surprising that initially their leaders were at a loss, 
however, all of them have accepted the need to transform their societies into market economies. 
Nevertheless, it was unclear what this transformation should look like and how to get through the 
adjustment period. The results of the process were different. In this report we will look at the three 
most interesting scenarios for development.  
STATES THAT SHOWED SOME IMPROVEMENT IN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 
KAZAKHSTAN  
Summary: Kazakhstan can be categorized as a state where economic and social as well as civil 
and political rights have been advanced. However, even Kazakhstan has made very uneven 
strides toward building a democracy, and that it is not the most democratic state in the region. 
Nevertheless, it is a state in which there has been a comprehensive overhaul of the political and 
economic system, and these developments are likely to be sustainable. The country has engaged 
in macro as well as micro economic reforms, and has done so in an environment which offers a 
limited commitment to developing the institutions associated with a democratic society.  
Moreover, given Kazakhstan's vast mineral wealth and very diverse agricultural and industrial 
economy, the long-term prospects that economic reform will succeed are quite good, which should 
give the government the ability to successfully fund the social reform programs which have been 
instituted in recent years. It may also make the government less reluctant to engage in more 
thoroughgoing democratic reforms.  
Kazakhstan's economy  
Kazakhstan had characteristics that set it apart from its Central Asian neighbors. Firstly, it is a 
rather big country by international standards not to mention by comparison to its Central Asian 
neighbors. Secondly, the country's northern oblasts were rather industrialized and dominated by 
Russians. Between 1985 and 1990, investment in fixed capital in Kazakhstan rose an average of 
3.9 percent per year.12 The structure of investment was also interesting as a major part of it (40 
percent) went into modernization of the existing enterprises. However, agriculture still accounted 
for 40 percent of GNP in 1990 twice that of industry.13 Kazakhstan's main industries include coal, oil, iron, steel, non-ferrous metals, cement, and fertilizers. The overwhelming majority of the 
Kazakh exports consisted of raw materials.  
Kazakhstan was the only Central Asian state that did not declare itself independent in the wake of 
the August 1991 coup. President Nazarbayev did not expect the Soviet Union to collapse and at 
the time remained more loyal to President Gorbachev than to Yeltsin. With the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and unexpected independence, the country was faced with several dilemmas, among 
them how to deal with Russia with whom the country shared an over 6,000 kilometer long border, 
how to deal with the Russian minority that constituted 39 percent of the countries population (while 
the titular nation accounted for just 36 percent).  
Deteriorating economic conditions made the choice of strategy more pressing. From 1991 to 1992, 
Kazakhstan's per capita GDP at the purchasing power parity (PPP) declined by 5 percent, 
industrial production by 17 percent, construction declined by 43 percent. Over the same period 
expenditures on education, culture, and scientific research decreased by 1.5 percent and the 
population disposable incomes declined by 45.8 percent.14 As a result, some Western experts 
believed that 71 percent of the population lived below the official poverty level.15  
There has been a basic tension in Kazakhstan's foreign economic policy from the onset. 
Kazakhstan's first response was to preserve some degree of integration among the former 
republics of the Soviet Union. President Nazarbayev is one of the strongest supporters of some 
sort of integration be it within the CIS framework or within Euro-Asian Union. However, he was 
never happy with the Russian domination of the CIS and wanted to build relations on the basis of 
equal partnership. Nevertheless, he still supports the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Nazarbayev has recently reiterated that he would like to 
see Central Asia as a single geopolitical and geo-economic region.  
However, the President realized that in order for Kazakhstan to be a desirable partner, it had to 
achieve economic growth and prosperity. This could only be done as a result of a complete 
overhaul of the existing economic structure. Introduction of private property was an important first 
step. Privatization in Kazakhstan was done in several stages: privatization of housing using flat 
coupons (1991-92), mass privatization using investment privatization coupons (1993-95), and 
privatization on the basis of individual projects (1996-98). As a result by 1999 the private sector 
employed around 60 percent of the labor force.16 As of July 1999, 75.6 percent of the economy 
was privatized, including 80.2 percent of small enterprises, 40.8 percent of medium enterprises, 
and 52 percent of large enterprises.17 The process was not as equitable and fair as was hoped. In 
fact, the Financial Times labeled the latest stage of privatization "the Kazakh sale of the century."18  
In economic terms, Kazakhstan can be considered a relative success in the post-Soviet world. 
Kazakhstan consciously conducted internationally oriented policies to counteract Russia's 
influence. Kazakhstan received $1.65 billion in World Bank loans between 1992 and 1998 and 
$500 million in IMF loans between 1993 and 1998.19 The country has attracted the highest rate in 
the CIS of per capita direct foreign investment, having received about $8.2 billion by 2000.20 In 
1999 alone, foreign direct investment totaled $1.5 billion.21 Kazakhstan's per capita GDP was 
second only to Russia, at $1,340 in 1997.22  These numbers should be taken with a grain of salt since FDI was concentrated in oil and gas 
sectors, which received 47.9 percent of the total FDI from 1993 and 1998 and 82.1 percent of FDI 
in the first quarter of 1999.23 Despite of the region's highest GDP per capita over half of the 
population live below the poverty line. In 1998, despite some macroeconomic improvement, there 
were further signs of trouble. In February the government suspended privatization in the oil sector 
due to the industry's crisis brought about by low world prices for oil. The Russian financial 
meltdown in August 1998 affected many of its neighbors, including Kazakhstan. The country was 
forced to devalue its currency, the tenge, and by the end of 1999 it has depreciated by 40 percent.  
President Nazarbayev has pursued a very public anti-corruption campaign. He believes that 
corruption "threatens the existence of the state."24 The amount of corruption is staggering. For 
example, Kazakhstan is said to have lost $500 million just in 1996 because of corruption in the oil 
sector.25 A scandal erupted in January 1996 after some Kazakh diplomats who accompanied 
President Nazarbayev on his visit to Israel, spent $250,000 on a shopping spree.26 During the anti-
corruption campaign the president dismissed Chief Justice Mikhail Malakhov for taking over 
$100,000 in bribes, Minister of Economics Mars Urkumbayev for power abuse and currency 
machinations, former Central Bank chairman Galym Bainazarov for offering a bribe to then Interior 
Minister Baekenov, and Interior Minister Vladimir Shumov for covering up his son's bribe-taking, 
just to name a few.27 In November 1997, Nazarbayev ordered high-ranking officials to declare all 
personal income. In October 1999 as a result of the latest government reshuffle Kazymzhomart 
Tokayev was appointed prime minister and Grigory Marchenko head of the National Bank. In 
making the announcement, Nazarbayev stressed clean records of both of his nominees and their 
personal moral purity. Yet charges of corruption still dog key figures in the Kazakh government and 
their families.  
At the same time there is reason for optimism that Kazakhstan will succeed in realizing increasing 
profits from its oil and gas sector. From the beginning, Kazakhstan has been dogged by the 
challenge of trying to export its oil. The Tengiz oil deposit (being developed by Chevron and an 
international consortium) is to export oil through a CPC (Caspian Pipeline Consortium) which goes 
across Russia. Additional oil development will require new pipeline routes.  
There is some progress in this regard. In November 1999 Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and 
Turkey finally signed an agreement to build a pipeline from Baku (Azerbaijan) to Ceyhan (Turkey) 
that would transport Caspian oil from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan to the rest of the world. However, 
it is still not clear how Russia is going to react to this and how the whole thing is going to play out. If 
it is successful, Kazakhstan stands to receive considerable revenue for the country's annual crude 
oil potential is about 15 million metric tons but in the longer run it will rise 10-fold.28  
Even now Kazakhstan's economy shows signs of improvement. Third quarter economic 
performance statistics from 1999 indicate that Kazakhstan is recovering from the economic crisis of 
1998, as they show an increase in GDP of 0.3 percent over the same period last year.29 Only time 
will tell if this is going to be sustained.  
Kazakhstan's Political System  
Yet Kazakhstan's political institutions may not be changing fast enough to support and strengthen 
the economic reforms that have been taken. Kazakhstan has a strong presidential system of government, which to date has been led by only one man. President Nazarbayev, former first-
secretary of the Kazakhstan Communist Party, was directly elected president in 1991. In March 
1995, Nazarbayev dissolved parliament and ruled by decree. In April 1995, a reported 95 percent 
of voters approved extending his rule to the year 2000. In August 1995 as a result of another 
popular referendum, a new constitution was adopted. It gave the president more powers, including 
the right to dissolve parliament if it passes a no-confidence vote in the government or twice rejects 
a president's nominee for prime minister. The president can ask the parliament to delegate 
legislative powers to him for a term not exceeding one year. Such a request must be approved by 
two-thirds of deputies at the joint session of parliament. In accordance with the current constitution 
the president appoints government and regional leaders. The president also has a right to annul or 
suspend decrees by government and akims of oblasts, major cities, and the capital.  
The country's parliament consists of two chambers: the lower (Majilis) and the upper (the Senate). 
Deputies of the lower chamber are elected by direct secret ballot and senators are elected by 
regional councils. As a result of the December 1995 parliamentary elections the president received 
a rather compliant parliament in largely uncontested election, with Nazarbayev supporters taking all 
the seats. The PNEK (People's National Unity Party) dominated the vote for the Majilis, or lower 
house.  
Kazakhstan is a presidential state. Groups loyal to President Nazarbayev and members of his 
family dominate key parts of the economy and government positions. His daughter, Dariga, 
controls the national television network. Her husband, Rakhat Aliyev, is head of the tax police. 
Another son-in-law, Timur Kulibayev, is the financial director and vice president of Kazakhoil. The 
company is believed to have provided funds for the move to a new capital.30  
The government of the country has become less democratic as the control of the president and his 
family has been enhanced. In October 1998, the parliament adopted nineteen amendments to the 
constitution, thirteen of which were proposed by President Nazarbayev. As a result, the presidential 
election was moved from December 2000 to January 1999, the president's term of office was 
extended from five to seven years, the age-limit and two-term restrictions were dropped. In addition 
to the already constitutionalized right to appoint and dismiss the government, regional leaders, and 
the head of the country's National Bank among others, the President received a right appoint 
chairman of the budget committee and two of his deputies. The president no longer has to submit 
international treaties for parliamentary approval.  
Since the October 1998 constitutional amendments were unexpected, the opposition had slightly 
over a month to register a presidential candidate. In addition, in November 1998 former Prime 
Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin was denied registration because of his participation in a meeting of 
the unsanctioned "Movement for Fair Elections", as these activities gained him a recent criminal 
record, and the latter was a legal bar to running for office. The OSCE observers criticized the 
election campaign for violations and petitioned to postpone the elections to give opponents more 
time to campaign. The requests were denied and in January 1999 Nazarbayev was reelected 
president for a seven-year term.  
In addition, the October 1998 constitutional amendments raised term of office of a deputy of the 
lower chamber (Majilis) was from 4 to 5 years and that of a deputy of the upper chamber (Senate) from 5 to 6 years; the number of deputies of Majilis was increased from 67 to 77 with additional ten 
seats to be contested by political parties. The constitutional changes opened up the electoral 
process to some degree. The amendments lower the size of the election fee for candidates (from 
1,000 to 100 minimum wages for a presidential candidate and from 100 to 50 minimum wages for a 
parliamentary candidate), lift the ban on electing people who earlier were held responsible for 
participation in unregistered public groups, and cancel the 50 percent minimum figure for voter 
turnout to make the polls legitimate.  
In the October 1999 parliamentary elections to Majilis, members of four political parties got over the 
seven percent threshold and will occupy the ten seats. Communists and Agrarians are the only 
opposition parties, whereas Otan (Fatherland) and the Civic party are clearly pro-presidential. Otan 
won 23 seats (4 on the party ticket and 19 in single-mandate constituencies). The Civic party won 
12 seats, the Communist party 3, the Agrarian party 2, and the Republican Party 1. The remaining 
33 seats were taken by various pressure groups and individuals.31  
During the first round Otan received 30.89 percent of the vote, the Communists-17.75 percent, the 
Agrarian party 12.63, the Civic party 11.23 percent, the Azamat 4.57 percent, the people's 
congress of Kazakhstan 2.83, the Alash party 2.76 percent, the Revival party 1.97, and the Labor 
party 1.38 percent. Voter turnout was 59.78 percent.32  
One hundred seventy international observers, including 150 from OSCE monitored the voting. 
Vladimir Yatsenko, member of the Ukrainian parliament and the CIS Interparliamentary assembly 
said that there were no major irregularities in the elections.33 However, the general view was not 
that optimistic and the majority of the outside observers considered Kazakhstan's 1999 
parliamentary elections to be seriously flawed. Many of Kazakhstan's opposition parties, the 
Azamat, Socialists (former Communists), the nationalist Azat (Freedom) Party, the ethnic-Russian 
Unity Party, and the rightist Respublika Party, have complained of harassment, surveillance, denial 
of access to the state-run media, and arbitrary banning from registering candidates.  
Vladimir Chernyshev, who formerly stood for election as a deputy in the lower house of parliament 
has officially requested the British embassy in Kazakhstan to grant him political asylum. The 
reason cited is the "impossibility of being able to exercise the right to be elected;" and Chernyshev 
has maintained the "It is better to live in a monarchy than in secular, law-government 
Kazakhstan."34  
Political and Human Rights in Kazakhstan  
These charges are consistent with the growing number of complaints of human rights violations by 
Kazakh political activists.  
Political freedom: In June 1998 Kazakhstan adopted a law on the national security. Threats to 
national security include political extremism, incitement of social discontent, unsanctioned 
gatherings, hindrance of investment activity, deterioration in the demographic situation and the 
quality of education. The procurator general can suspend the activity of the news media without 
providing for any right of appeal. Dissemination of all foreign media that undermines national 
security is also outlawed and in October 1999 authorities briefly took off the air Russian TV 
channels that broadcast the discovery of President Nazarbayev's Swiss bank account.  Yevgeny Zhovtis, Kazakh International Human Rights Director, said that no citizen of Kazakhstan 
is safe from unlawful arrests, criminal cases falsifications, tortures, beatings, unjust court 
proceedings.35 In May 1998, the country's mass media was investigated for committing over 200 
violations of the Law on the Press. Mass media were charged with "abuses of freedom of speech, 
incitement of national enmity...aimed at instigating disputes and controversy over the country's 
history and sovereignty" and for permitting "non-objective, insulting statements directed at 
government organs, officials and ordinary citizens... it is the media that should shape the ideals of 
our state and patriotic feelings." In late 1999 the headquarters of the human rights organization that 
Zhovtis heads was destroyed by fire, including all of his archives and computer equipment.  
Despite the growing atmosphere of intimidation, there are still several independent newspapers, 
though most of them have been shut down under various pretences and some were even subject 
to firebomb attacks. Newspaper distribution system is controlled by the state. The government has 
used exorbitant rates to price out independent radio stations. As a result, there are now only four 
nominally non-state television channels and three independent radio stations in Almaty. Libel laws 
are used by authorities to discourage free speech. Insulting the president is a criminal offense and 
at least one journalist has received a year-long sentence based on this charge.  
Official delay of registration of political parties, movements, and organizations is another popular 
tactic. In February 1999, the Kazakh agency for property and legal enterprise registration was 
accused of delaying registration in Almaty of an opposition organization (a republican movement 
For Fair Elections) in violation of the country's legislation. Similar incidents have been reported in 
other regions. Freedom of assembly is restricted. Several unsanctioned rallies by workers, 
pensioners, and the political opposition to protest deteriorating social and economic conditions 
were broken up by police who detained demonstrators.  
Ethnic relations: Kazakhstan is the most multi-ethnic among the former Soviet States with a large 
Russian minority. In fact it was the only one at which the eponymous nationality was not a majority 
at the time of independence. This affects the strategy that the country chooses and also 
determines the degree of vulnerability to the Russian security threats and Russian views of the 
territory as "its own". Maintaining ethnic harmony is one of the most important challenges that 
Kazakhstan faces and the leaders are determined to single-mindedly pursue this goal. The need 
for the government to keep potential ethnic antagonisms in check is a frequently cited reason for 
why informal political groups and political parties that are organized largely along ethnic lines are 
either banned or kept in close check by the government. Political parties cannot be organized 
exclusively along ethnic lines, and ethnic affinity groups must be careful that their charters not be 
able to be construed as advocating ethnic exclusivity or they too are apt to be denied registration. 
For example, Russian Lad (Harmony) and Edinstvo (Unity), as well as the Kazakh group Azat 
(Freedom) were denied registration as political parties and could register as public organizations, 
which did not allow them to run in parliamentary elections. However, the Kazakh group Alash, 
named after a mythic founder of the Kazakh people, and several of the Cossack organizations 
were banned since a program of radical Islam in the case of the former and demands for ethnic 
autonomy by the latter were equally unacceptable.  
While Kazakh groups have occasionally been denied registration, most prominently Alash, non-
Kazakhs generally claim that they are subjected to a different standard than are the Kazakhs. Russians, Germans, and other non-Kazakhs also have charged discrimination in favor of ethnic 
Kazakhs in state-run businesses, government, housing and education. Since gaining 
independence, over a million Russians have left the country, and two thirds of the country's ethnic 
German have moved to the Federal Republic of Germany. These two communities have left for a 
complex set of motives. The Uighurs who have ethnic ties to their restive kin in China's Xinjiang 
province, have been a particular target of the Kazakh government. Given Kazakhstan's desire to 
remain on good terms with China, and have been banned from demonstrating and holding political 
meetings.  
Changing language laws make non-Kazakhs feel disadvantaged. This is the case because the 
constitution mandated that Kazakh would become the official state language, even though the 
deadline by which this is to be achieved has been repeatedly pushed back. Legislation passed in 
1989 made Kazakh the official language of the republic, although the law would not take effect in 
the most heavily populated Russian areas for fifteen years. A new language law was passed in 
1997, extending the date by which all citizens would be expected to function in Kazakh to January 
1, 2006. This law purported to put Russian on an equal footing with the Kazakh through such 
provisions as requiring both languages to be used in the armed forces, police, and security 
services.36  
At the same time, Kazakh is beginning to push Russian out of public life. Currently Kazakh is the 
language of instruction in 3,357 schools; Russian in 2,412 schools, 2,153 schools use both 
languages, 78 use Uzbek, 13 use Uighur, and several schools use Tajik, Ukrainian, Turkish, and 
German. In colleges and universities students are educated in Kazakh (27%), Russian (72%), or in 
Uzbek, English, and German (0.5%).37  
Russian groups feel disadvantaged in other ways. One particular target of the Kazakh government 
has been the Cossacks, the descendants of the old Tsarist frontier forces. The Cossacks are 
viewed by the Kazakh authorities as having strong separatist inclinations. As a result, there is a 
ban on wearing traditional Cossack uniform and criminal charges were brought against the 
Cossack ataman in March 1999 under clause 236 of the criminal code (for organizing para-military 
units), which could result in 3-7 year prison term. Semirechensk Cossack community waited 16 
months to be officially registered and the Association of Russian, Cossack and Slavonic 
organizations waited 10 months. As of August 1999, the authorities were denying registration to 
four regional branches of the organization in Pavlodarsk, Kustanai, and two other places.38  
Social conditions in Kazakhstan  
Social indicators:39  
Since independence many of the formerly guaranteed privileges have been abolished, while the 
government is attempting to reorganize and redefine others to make them self-supporting 
financially. These changes are all part of an effort to make link state payment of benefits to the 
economic capacity of the state.  
The overhaul of the pension system is the most dramatic change. The government has also 
introduced a three-stage pension reform aimed at changing the country's pension system from a 
benefit to a contribution one. Private pension funds have been created and now employers are required to deposit fifteen percent of salaries in those funds. The Asian Development Bank praised 
the reform efforts and provided a $100 million loan to support it.  
The country's population is slowly aging for the 1997 rate of natural increase was -0.4 percent. 
Only 29.3 percent of the population are less than fifteen years old. Life expectancy at birth is 59 
years for males and 70 years for females. This makes reforming the healthcare system a much 
more urgent task than was originally believed. However, in 1997 the number of doctors per 10,000 
people dropped from 33.1 to 32.4 percent. More than 1,500 villages and auls do not have any 
medical personnel. Kazakhstan's budget owes the country's medical personnel 15.3 million tenge.  
Kazakhstan continues to finance mandatory, free, and secular secondary school education and in 
1997 allocated 3.4 percent of GDP for these purposes. In an attempt to educate diverse groups of 
population, the government mandated that students from rural areas should comprise at least 30 
percent of the student body in colleges and universities. However, teachers' average salary is 70 
percent of the country's average. This forces many of them to look for alternative employment. As a 
result, the number of secondary schools in rural areas has been reduced. Many children have to 
travel for hours before they get to school. Thus, in 1997, 27,000 children did not attend school 
because it was too far away. About 50 percent of the existing schools provide only elementary or 
incomplete secondary education.  
Some benefits have been reduced or abolished outright. For example, single mothers used to 
receive child support payment from the state that were made regardless of a mother's income. Now 
these subsidies are available only to those, whose total income per person is less than twice the 
indicator used in calculating pensions and other social benefits. In 1996, 1.5 million children 
received those benefits but in 1997 their number was just 1 million. However, special subsidies to 
WWII veterans and to families of victims of Chernobyl and other radiation accidents at military and 
civilian installations continue to be allocated.  
Income distribution became more uneven between urban and rural areas. The Gini coefficient 
increased from 20.2 percent in 1991 to 33.8 percent in 1997. In 1996, a little over a third of 
population lived below the official poverty line. In 1997 the relevant number was 43%, out of which 
39.8 percent lived in urban and 46% in rural areas. Rural population is 45.2 percent of the country's 
total population. Urban population's incomes are 2-2.5 times higher than are those of the rural 
population. At the end of 1998, number of unemployed receiving unemployment benefits was 
149,200 (59.2%). Out of them 53,400 lived in rural areas.  
The population at the beginning of 1998 was 15.6 million people, which represents a net loss of 
almost one million people since the last Soviet census in 1989.40 The out-migration is also 
disproportionately affecting urban areas that are home to fifty five percent of the population. In 
1996-98, 132,600 people immigrated to and 772,500 emigrated from Kazakhstan; 64.5 percent of 
emigrants were in the labor force; 50,600 people from rural areas and 106,500 people from urban 
areas. In 1997, 35,936 people immigrated to and 239,441 emigrated from Kazakhstan and the 
country had a negative migration balance with Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, and 
Uzbekistan.41  The migration process is changing the ethnic makeup of the country. Currently Kazakhs account 
for at least 46 percent of the population of the country, and official Kazakh government sources put 
them at 52 percent.42 Russians make up between 30-35 percent, again, depending upon the 
source while Ukrainians are about 5 percent, German approximately 3 percent), Uzbeks and 
Tatars 2 percent each (although it is very easy for Uzbeks and Tatars to "switch" to Kazakh 
nationality).  
In addition, Kazakhstan has a refugee population and hosts about 35,000 refugees including 
25,000 ethnic Kazakh in-migrants, 6,000 Tajiks, 3,000 Afghans, Chechens, Georgians and 
Armenians, as well as some cases from African and other countries including China. The majority 
of the refugee population is located in the south of the country.43  
In January 1999, Kazakhstan acceded to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol. 
These documents do not require states to provide asylum to refugees but they do include an 
explicit prohibition against refoulement -- expelling or returning refugees to countries where their 
lives or freedom would be threatened. The Kazakh government tries hard to keep their country 
from becoming a safe haven for potentially politically troublesome people. For example, in August 
1998 three Uighurs illegally crossed the Kazakh border and requested political asylum on "ethnic 
and political grounds." However, in February 1999 Kazakhstan deported them back to China. An 
even more striking case came during Russia's second Chechen war, in November 1999, when the 
Kazakh government introduced strict border regimes to try and limit Chechen refugees from 
entering the country. This behavior indicates that there is some awareness on the part of the 
government of the potential vulnerability of the state, but the government shows no signs of 
panicking over the prospect that it may face social or political problems in the future.  
STATES THAT HAVE HAD AN INCREASE IN POLITICAL RIGHTS WHILE LOSING GROUND 
IN THE ECONOMY 
KYRGYZSTAN  
Summary: Despite the fact that Kyrgyzstan has had a very comprehensive economic reform, at 
least when judged by the standards of the region, the country has generally witnessed a reversal in 
social and economic development. At the same time, overall the country has made substantial 
progress in terms of development of democratic political institutions, and has done so in an 
atmosphere, which has generally been very supportive of individual human rights. Over the past 
few years, however, there have been disturbing signs of backsliding on some of these areas, and 
these will receive particular attention.  
One of the great challenges to Kyrgyzstan's proponents of democratic reform has been to find 
ways to address the country's serious economic problems. These problems, which are partly the 
consequence of the country's economic starting point, persist despite serious state efforts to 
sponsor macro-economic reforms. These problems are becoming increasingly more serious as 
support from the international community is reaching a point in which it is intended to lead to self-
sustaining economic changes. The current economic climate will make it harder to sustain social 
rights, which in turn could create serious challenges for the political system.  The Crisis of Independence in Kyrgyzstan  
With population of 4.7 million Kyrgyzstan is more densely populated than is Kazakhstan (22 people 
per square kilometer) and over 60 percent of the population live in rural areas. Kyrgyzstan was 
traditionally one of the poorest countries of the former Soviet Union with per capita GDP in 1991 at 
PPP of just $3,525, which was slightly over a half of Russia's. 44 Out of the 15 republics of the 
former Soviet Union only Tajikistan and Uzbekistan had a lower per capita GDP in 1991.45 Trade 
was predominantly conducted with the FSU and the country had a trade deficit of about 14 percent. 
As a result foreign exchange reserves were negligible.  
The collapse of the Soviet Union aggravated the economic situation in Kyrgyzstan. In 1992 
Kyrgyzstan's GDP per capita at PPP declined by 18 percent, industrial production dropped by over 
26 percent, agriculture and forestry declined by almost 7 percent, and share of transportation and 
communications in GDP by over one third. Heavily dependent on trade with the former Soviet 
republics, it saw its net exports decline sevenfold.46 Between 1991 and 1995 the country's GDP 
plummeted by 45 percent. Industrial output in 1998 was only one-third of the 1991 level.47  
This had to have devastating effects on the country's social safety net. Just in 1992 health services 
declined by 44 percent and spending on education, culture, and science by 31 percent, a trend that 
continued until 1996 when for the first time since 1991 they increased by three percent.48 
Nevertheless, in 1995 Kyrgyzstan spent 55 percent of its budget on social needs, more than any 
other CIS state.49 The situation was exacerbated by the fact that 40 percent of the population are 
children under 16 and fifteen percent are pensioners, so the pressure on the social safety net is 
enormous. This pressure created strong incentives for the country to engage in economic and 
political reforms.  
Economic reforms  
Kyrgyzstan initially achieved considerable international support for its economic reforms by being 
the first former Soviet republic to leave the ruble zone in May 1993 and the first to introduce its own 
internationally supported currency, the som; it was the first CIS country to introduce Bankruptcy 
Law in December 1993, the first CIS country to enjoy GDP growth in 1996, and the first CIS 
country to be admitted into the WTO in December 1998.  
The country embarked on an ambitious privatization program, divided into three stages. During the 
first stage (1991 to 1993) 97.2 percent of small companies in retail and food production/primary 
processing, 86.7 percent of companies in catering, and 100 percent of service companies were 
privatized. During the second stage (1994-1995) 6,269 companies in core sectors, such as 
industry, transport, and construction, were privatized.50 By April 1997, 62.9 percent of the economy 
have been privatized, including 80.4 percent of industry, 56.8 percent of construction, 51.2 percent 
of transportation.51 The current, third, stage aims to privatize large companies in the major sectors 
of the national economy, subject to certain restrictions.  
Kyrgyzstan's geographic location and economic inheritance from the Soviet Union made president 
Akaev's task so much harder. Those in power in Kyrgyzstan have further complicated their 
economic tasks by not taking adequate measures to combat and punish corruption.  Nation building and democracy are generally taxing on the economy but Kyrgyzstan's case was 
complicated by the fact that the country did not have many resources at its disposal. Its only hope 
for survival lies in attracting foreign support. Kyrgyzstan is not rich in mineral resources with an 
exception of gold and hydroelectric power. The country's gold reserves are estimated to be around 
600 tons. According to experts at Kyrgyzenergo, the country's total hydropower reserves exceed 
43 billion kWt/H. However, existing hydropower potential is utilized at only thirty percent.52 
Electricity accounts for 19 percent of the country's exports.  
To attract foreign investment Kyrgyzstan conducted a comprehensive land reform with the October 
1998 national referendum approving private ownership of land. The country also embarked on a 
radical tax reform that reduced the number of taxes and lowered tax rates. In 1998, countries of the 
European Union invested about $14.5 million and the US $24 million.53 But the 1996 $90 million 
investment by the Canadian gold company Cameco to develop Kumtor gold mine, which is 
considered the world's 10th largest gold deposit, had the most significant affect on the Kyrgyz 
economy.54 To illustrate the degree of Kyrgyzstan's dependence on foreign investment, it should 
be sufficient to say that the country's GDP growth in both 1996 and 1997 and possibly even in 
1998 was generated by this investment. There is a possibility of succumbing to the "Dutch disease" 
where the country's economy becomes inextricably tied to gold production and other industries 
remain underdeveloped.55  
However, investors' confidence began to decline in 1998 when allegations of corruption involving 
sales of gold and manipulations of privatization began to resurface. This caused the resignation of 
long time Prime Minister Dzumagulov and a reshuffle of the whole government. The country had $1 
billion in foreign debt, a substantial budget deficit, and plunging exports. This made foreign 
investors more cautious, particularly since there began to accumulate evidence that efforts to 
curtail corrupt practices were oftentimes being made to settle political scores rather than as part of 
an effort to even the playing field.  
Kyrgyzstan's economy was dealt a further blow by the Russian economic meltdown of August 17, 
1998. Kyrgyzstan is dependent on sales to Russia and it saw its exports to Russia collapse as a 
result of the Russian financial crisis. As a result, Kyrgyzstan's exports to CIS countries fell 28 
percent in 1998.56 The country's GDP growth slowed from 10 percent in 1997 to barely 2 percent in 
1998. In addition, the country plans to spend 40 percent of the 2000 budget to repay foreign debt.57 
The latest FDI trends are also not favorable for most of foreign investment in the region is going 
into oil and gas sectors which Kyrgyzstan has none. This creates a double bind for Kyrgyzstan, 
which has to try harder to entice foreign investors, and is also dependent on imports of natural gas 
and oil from Uzbekistan and exports of electricity to Kazakhstan. The Russian financial crisis 
affected these countries as well and thus, worsened the situation in Kyrgyzstan.  
Political reforms  
The leadership in Kyrgyzstan has taken great pains to create a sense of history that emphasizes 
the democratic elements which have allegedly always been present in its society. Its leaders like to 
boast that unlike other Asian countries, the Kyrgyz elected their khans (rulers). Women had equal 
rights with men, and there was freedom of speech. There is also an emphasis on the consultative 
aspect of nomadic society, where decisions affecting the community were traditionally taken by the 
Khans in consultation with tribes.  At the same time, like Kazakhstan, over time power in Kyrgyzstan has become more vested in the 
presidency. In October 1994 President Akaev held a national referendum on constitutional changes 
and creation of a new parliament structure, that was to be a body of professional legislators. Three 
fourths of those who turned out to vote approved the changes and a creation of a bicameral, 105-
member parliament (Jogorku Kenesh), with a 35-seat lower chamber as a permanent legislature 
and a 70-member upper chamber to meet only occasionally to approve the budget and consider 
presidential appointees to various government posts. The upper chamber was to be comprised of 
regional elite who would represent their local interests and in Akaev's view would resemble the 
House of Lords.58 As a result of the referendum the old Communist-dominated parliament was 
dissolved.  
In the February 1995 parliamentary elections, Communists gained only a few seats and the 
majority of the 82 seats went to the president's supporters. Akaev won the December 24, 1995 
contested presidential elections and received 75 percent of the popular vote. By contrast, the 
presidents of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan chose to extend their terms through the 
use of referendum.  
In early January 1996 the newly re-elected President stressed the need for expanding presidential 
powers and proposed to hold another referendum on February 10 that changed more than half of 
the constitution to enhance presidential power. The new document gave the president the power to 
appoint all top officials, although the prime minister still requires parliamentary approval. If 
parliament rejects three of the president's nominees, he can dissolve the body. In July 1998 the 
Constitutional Court ruled that Akaev can seek a third term in office.  
In October 1998, another national referendum on constitutional amendments was held. Members 
of the lower house of parliament (the Legislative Assembly) were to be elected by a simple majority 
and the number of seats were to be increased from 35 to 60, fifteen out of which were to be given 
to representatives of political parties. Parliamentary immunity was also limited. The number of 
seats in the upper house of parliament (Assembly of People's Representatives) was decreased 
from 70 to 45. These changes effectively further circumscribed the power and independence of 
parliament, but they also created increased incentives for the formation of political parties.  
In February 2000, Kyrgyzstan held parliamentary elections. Eleven political parties contested 15 
party seats. However, only six managed to clear the 5 percent barrier: the Communist Party gained 
27 percent of the vote, the pro-government Union of Democratic Forces 17 percent, the Women's 
Democratic Party 13 percent, the Party of War Veterans 9 percent, the pro-presidential "My 
Country" 5.7 percent, and the moderate opposition Ata-Meken 5.6 percent. The March run-off 
elections in single-mandate districts resulted in the parliament's overall centrist orientation. The 
OSCE characterized the February Kyrgyz parliamentary elections as "not in full compliance with 
OSCE commitments." The statement noted interference in the election campaign by public 
prosecutors, the exclusion of major opposition parties, attempts by some candidates to bribe 
voters, and cases of multiple voting or pressure on voters to cast their ballot for a specific 
candidate.59  
Political and human rights in Kyrgyzstan  
Political freedoms: Kyrgyzstan is sometimes called a center of democracy in Central Asia. President Akaev is careful to present his country this way to be able to attract foreign investment 
that the country desperately needs. He tries to appear to be a true "people's" president, and this 
was an important factor in the decision to hold presidential elections in 1995. Pressure by the 
international community was said to have also played an important role, and again it was more 
effective in Kyrgyzstan than elsewhere because of the importance to Akaev of fostering the image 
of democratic ruler. Reports indicated that ballot stuffing, inflation of voter turnout, and intimidation 
of the press marred the 1995 presidential elections.  
In many ways Kyrgyzstan is more solicitous of the need to protect the human rights of its citizens 
than virtually all of the other states in the region. However, violations of human rights do occur, and 
not infrequently. There is evidence of police abuse, religious persecution, trafficking of women, 
violations of the right to free expression, and intolerance of opposition.  
According to the 1999 Human Rights Watch report there were at least 2 reported deaths in 1998 
that occurred while suspects were in police custody and one of them was reportedly buried alive.60 
There are also reports of increased trafficking of women who respond to advertisements that 
promise them well-paid jobs abroad. In the end many of them are literally sold to various sex 
industry establishments in Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and other countries. Kyrgyz officials 
are said to turn a blind eye to such a trafficking of women out of the country, by receiving bribes 
from in return for forged travel documents.  
President Akaev has created himself an image of a supporter of the freedom of speech. He put on 
a national referendum an amendment to the constitution that would guarantee greater freedom of 
speech, proposed to decriminalize slander and make it a civil offence, vetoed a media law that 
limited the topics legally covered by journalists and mandated them to reveal their sources under 
certain circumstances. At the same time during his tenure journalists have been harassed and sent 
to prisons for libel. Private radio stations have also been shut down.  
Kyrgyzstan currently finds itself in the difficult position of trying to balance the freedom of religion 
that is guaranteed by the constitution and the dangers posed by the rise of Islamic extremism. 
Kyrgyzstan had the first hand experience on the matter. In August 1999, about 500 Islamic 
extremists attacked its territory and took several people hostage, including Japanese geologists 
and Major General Anarbek Shamkeyev, commander of Kyrgyzstan's Interior Troops. The captors 
were said to be Uzbek militants that were hiding in Tajikistan. They demanded free passage for 
Majahedeen troops to the Uzbek territory and release of their supporters who are currently jailed in 
Uzbekistan. They were believed to have links with the Islamic Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Liberation Party) 
organization. This crisis continued for several months, and only ended after the Japanese were 
alleged to have paid the captors a substantial ransom for the release of their citizens. The latter is 
rumored to have gone on with the approval of the Kyrgyz government. This money will certainly 
enhance the capacity of militants to threaten the states of the region.  
At the same time, the Kyrgyz authorities have also shown excessive zeal in their quest against 
Muslim extremism. They closed an Islamic Center after accusing its leaders to be Wahhabi, the 
term used by the authorities to describe all Islamic fundamentalists. They then deported "Wahhabi 
supporters" from the country, even though in some cases they were CIS citizens (they included 
citizens of the neighboring Pakistan and Uzbekistan, a refugee from Tajikistan).  The government continues to display intolerance of political opposition members. Some are 
arrested on charges of criminal libel and insulting the honor and dignity of the president, others on 
charges of embezzlement, which seems to be a prevalent charge. Before the October 1998 
referendum the Ministry of Justice revoked the registration of the Kyrgyz Committee for Human 
Rights, which made it impossible for the organization to monitor the voting.  
There are about 20 officially registered political parties, the largest being the Communists on the 
left, the nationalist Asaba, and the Social Democrats, the Republican Party, the Agrarians, and 
Erkin (Freedom). The largest political movement is the pro-government Democratic Movement of 
Kyrgyzstan. Most parties are small and weak, with vague platforms and little financial support. The 
newest political party is Ar-Namys (Dignity) that was founded in August 1999 by the former mayor 
of Bishkek Felix Kulov. With 11,000 members it has already become the third largest party in the 
country, and is likely to become the largest opposition group. However, in March 2000 Felix Kulov 
was arrested on three charges: arranging for the transfer of military and security material to 
Tajikistan in 1994-95 without government authorization, purchasing surveillance equipment with 
outside funds for use by the Ministry of State Security when he was Minister, and promoting a 
subordinate who lacked higher education, or extensive experience. Arrests of opposition leaders 
are nothing new for in January 2000, Daniyar Usenov, opposition El (Bei-Bechara) Party leader 
and parliament deputy, was arrested for failing to appear in court in connection with a case brought 
against him in 1996 and subsequently closed. In addition, several opposition parties were 
precluded from participation in the February 2000 parliamentary elections.  
Kyrgyzstan is constantly afraid of ruining relations with its big and powerful neighbors. Though 
many Kyrgyz live across the border in China, Bishkek does little to support them. Nor does it allow 
much of the activities of the Uighurs on its territory in order not to anger China. On the contrary the 
government discourages local Uighur population from supporting their co-nationals in China, who 
seek independence. It is not surprising that around the time of president Akaev's visit to China in 
April 1999, the Kyrgyz security forces broke up an Uighur separatist network with links to Islamists 
in Pakistan.  
President Akaev is probably the region's leading crusader in the war against drugs. Kyrgyzstan is 
also extremely concerned about proliferation of drugs in the region and is trying to strengthen its 
border with Tajikistan, which due to political instability is one of the main conduits for the Afghan 
drugs on their way to Europe. Kyrgyzstan now has 50,000 officially registered drug users but the 
actual number of drug addicts is probably much higher. This is a sharp increase from only 3.9 per 
hundred thousand in 1991. What is more alarming is that some 75 percent of the addicts are 
between the ages of 14 and 30. It is doubtful that the country has resources to deal with the strain 
that drug trafficking and proliferation would put on the country's budget for it will have to devote 
considerable resources to combat the spread of crime, corruption, and diseases, including AIDS, 
hepatitis, and others.61  
Ethnic relations: Kyrgyzstan is a multinational country in which 52 percent of the population are 
Kyrgyz, 18 percent Russian, 13 percent Uzbek, 3 percent Ukrainian, 2 percent German, and other 
smaller nationalities account for the remaining 12 percent. Kyrgyzstan has made much effort to 
maintain ethnic harmony among its population to make sure its powerful neighbors are happy as well as to prevent mass exodus of educated and skilled minorities. In May 2000 Kyrgyzstan 
designated Russian as the Republic's official language.  
The constitution guarantees rights of minorities, and there has been particular effort to try and 
satisfy the demands of the local Russian population. Russian has been made an official state 
language, equal in status to the Kyrgyz. Bishkek is also home a Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University, 
which uses Russian as its language and is financed by the Russian government. By contrast, at 
the same time the Uigur organization Ittipak (Unity) has faced sporadic suspension for "separatist 
activities."  
In many ways, the Uzbeks are Kyrgyzstan's most important minority. Kyrgyzstan considers the 
presence of a large Uzbek minority in southern Kyrgyzstan to be a major internal security threat, 
particularly since about 30 percent of the country's population lives there. In the south, Uzbeks 
account for 28.1 percent of the population. Memories of the 1990 Osh riots are still fresh in 
people's memory. More than 200 people died in those riots and several hundred were injured. On 
the surface tensions between the two nationalities have eased somewhat but this view is 
deceptive, as the presence of this large Uzbek population is seen to provide President Karimov (as 
well as future Uzbek leaders) with a powerful wedge to use in gaining favorable policy decisions 
from the Kyrgyz government.  
Social conditions:  
The country's population is 4.8 million and 62 percent of them live in rural areas. In addition, 37 
percent of the population is younger than fifteen years of age. Life expectancy is 62.5 years for 
males and 71.3 for females. Some 48 percent of the labor force are employed in agriculture and 
only 10 percent in industry. Unemployment rate is 7.6 percent. In 1997, total expenditure on 
education was approximately five percent of the GDP.62 The population growth rate is estimated at 
1.4 percent. In June 1997 in accordance with President Akaev's decree eight percent of state 
holdings in several telecommunications and power supply companies as well as in Air Kyrgyzstan 
were transferred to benefit war veterans and pensioners.63 However, the funds raised through this 
transfer of shares are not sufficient to meet the government's social welfare needs. Just in 
December 1999 the government announced that it owed 112 million soms (about $2.5 million) in 
pension arrears, 54 million soms to the health care system and a similar amount to educational 
establishments.64 As a result, public demonstrations by the poorer sectors of society have become 
a way of life.  
There are about 13,000 officially registered refugees, mainly ethnic Kyrgyz from Tajikistan and 
some - about 700 - from Afghanistan.65 However, most of the refugees are not registered and their 
total number can be as high as 50,000 or approximately one percent of Kyrgyzstan's population. 
Claiming refugee status is not an easy task since for example, the claim should be made within 
three days of arrival and a safe third country rule applies, which means that those who qualify are 
more likely to cross over to Kyrgyzstan from Uzbekistan.66  
MONGOLIA  
Summary Mongolia is a state that like Kyrgyzstan does not fit neatly into either of the first two 
categories. Like Kyrgyzstan, it is a close society and sparsely populated, so that elite consensus can lead to rapid and dramatic political changes. Yet, it is still too soon to feel confident that the 
economic changes necessary to sustain the democratization process will continue to occur.  
Mongolia is a land-locked country sparsely populated country with an area of 1,565,000 square 
kilometers and a population of 2.4 million people. The country boasts 2,200 years of statehood and 
being home for great rulers that dominated Asia and a major part of Europe for several centuries. 
However, the country had its share of strong external rulers as well. China controlled this vast 
Central Asian region for two centuries until 1911 and again from 1919 until a Marxist revolt in 1921. 
The Mongol Socialist Republic was formed in 1924 and for the next 66 years it was a Soviet 
satellite state.  
Mongolia is rich in mineral resources and has coal, iron, copper, gold, flourspar, uranium, and 
silver. Mongolia's two biggest foreign revenue earners are copper and cashmere. The country's 
geographic location between Russia and China predetermines its dependence on the big and 
powerful neighbors. During the Communist rule Mongolia heavily relied on Soviet support. By early 
1990s subsidies from the Soviet Union amounted up to 30 percent of the country's GDP.67 The 
collapse of the Soviet Union devastated Mongolia's economy. To avoid future dependence 
Mongolia tried to maintain equal distance from its powerful neighbors. Keeping its distance from 
Russia was not easy. In August 1994 Mongolian prime minister Puntsagiyn Jasray had to admit 
that "[the country's] economy, especially industry, [is] closely linked with corresponding sectors of 
the Russian economy because they were created with Russia's help and their products are 
intended for the Russian market."68  
Russia continues to exert influence over the country's economy. A ban by Russia on the export of 
petroleum caused chaos in Mongolia in August and September 1999 and led to the introduction of 
rationing. Even though the ban was later lifted, Mongolia was faced with higher fuel prices and a 
depreciating currency. The country lives in constant fear that Siberian power companies will cut off 
electricity supplies to the western part of the country.  
Mongolia was more successful at resisting being pulled into China's orbit. The two countries signed 
a friendship treaty in 1994 but Mongolia was not keen on becoming "friends," particularly after it 
discovered in 1995 that its embassy in Beijing had been bugged. However, Ulaanbaator is 
concerned about China's treatment of over 3 million Mongolians who live in the Chinese 
autonomous region of Inner Mongolia. At the same time, it maintains good relations with Tibet and 
even allows the Dalai Lama to pay an annual visit to Mongolia. Mongolia is relatively successful at 
navigating the region's "dangerous waters" for over the last eight years China has become the 
country's leading foreign investor and export market. President Jiang Zemin visited the country in 
July 1999.  
To be able to conduct a more or less independent course, Mongolia embarked on an ambitious 
reform plan. The 1992 constitution allowed private property on land. The country started a rapid 
privatization program. In 1990 the private sector accounted for just 10 percent of GDP. In 1990-92 
around 3,000 small and large enterprises have been privatized. By 1999 the private sector was 
responsible for 64 percent of economic activity (79 percent in agriculture and 90 percent in trade 
and services).69 However, the latest stage of privatization that was set to begin in August 1999 by 
sale of government shares in large enterprises has been delayed by parliamentarians, who are reluctant to relinquish control over strategic companies. In October 1999 Mongolia's parliament (the 
Great Hural) approved a list of 18 companies that were to remain under full government control.70  
In 1996 the government froze spending, lifted price controls, cut pension rolls, and abolished tariff 
protection from domestic industries. As a result of these reform-oriented policies, Mongolia was the 
first state from the Central Asian region to be allowed to join the WTO, in January 1997. In August 
1997 the country embarked on an ambitious program aimed at stabilizing the economy, reducing 
inflation, boosting the private sector, and reform social security, simplify the bureaucracy and 
channel more aid to the needy.  
By late 1990s the country had few capital controls. Inflation declined from 49.3 percent in 1996 to 
10.2 percent in 1998 and is likely to remain in the single digits in 1999.71 In December 1998 
Mongolia's central bank announced that it was expanding the reform of financial system and that 
maintaining the stability of the currency, the togrog, would be among the top priorities for 1999.72 
This year saw an increase in industrial and agricultural production and a decrease in the trade 
deficit.  
However, real GDP per capita at PPP fell from $1,640 in 1990 to $1,356 in 1998. The only growth 
industry was animal husbandry. Agriculture continues to account for about one-third of the 
country's GDP. According to official estimates, unemployment in 1998 was 3 percent. However, it 
is believed that the actual numbers are at least three times higher. 73  
Mongolia needs foreign assistance to be able to survive; however, the level of foreign investment 
remains low. In June 1999 President Bagabandi called for more foreign aid. During the past 8 
years the international community has provided Mongolia with loans and assistance worth $2 
billion.74 This year the IMF announced the resumption of enhanced structural adjustment facility 
(ESAF) payments. In June 1999 participants of an investment conference in Ulaanbaator pledged 
$320 million in loans and aid, which was the highest to date.75  
Political process:  
In July 1990 Mongolia held its first multiparty parliamentary elections, that were dominated by the 
Communist party, and in September Punsalmaagiyn Orchirbat, the party's chairman, was named 
president. In February 1992 the country adopted a new Constitution that established a single 
chamber parliament (the Great State Hural (Ulsyn Ikh Khural). Its 76 members were to be directly 
elected for a four-year term. The parliament has powers to nominate the president, elect the prime 
minister, and appoint the cabinet.76 The president is elected in direct elections for a term of four 
years. The president must approve candidates for prime minister and can veto legislation, subject 
to a two-thirds parliamentary override. After a prolonged deliberations the Constitutional Court 
finally ruled on November 24, 1998, that members of the Hural could not simultaneously hold 
ministerial posts.  
Mongolia's course toward rapid economic restructuring affected population's voting patterns. 
Reforms became synonymous with skyrocketing inflation and unemployment. As a result, the 
Communists managed to retain control during the 1992 parliamentary elections. Orchirbat was 
reelected in the 1993 presidential elections. It is interesting to note that he was not nominated by 
the Communists and ran as the candidate of the two main opposition parties, the National Democratic Party (NDP) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). These parties have later formed 
the opposition Democratic Union Coalition (DUC). By the end of 1995 the economy showed signs 
of recovery and people were ready to believe in the possibility of a better future. As a result the 
DUC won 50 seats in the June 1996 parliamentary elections. The Communists won just 25 seats 
and were out of power for the first time since 1924. A team of observers from the United States 
believed the elections to be "free and fair."77  
However, as the world commodity prices continued to decline, reformers once again fell out of 
favor. Nachagyn Bagbandy of the People's Revolutionary Party captured the May 1997 presidential 
elections with 60.81 percent of the vote. Incumbent president Ochirbat got 29.81 percent of the 
votes.78 Therefore, the country entered the period of co-habitation between a leftist president and a 
rightist government.  
The situation was complicated by the in fighting within the governing parliamentary coalition, which 
caused Enksaikhan government to resign in April 1998. Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj of the NDP was 
elected new prime minister but he was also forced to resign in July over the controversial bank 
mergers. The establishment of separation of powers in Mongolia has not been an easy process 
and in 1998 president Bagabandy repeatedly used his constitutional power to reject several 
candidates for prime minister suggested by the opposition parliament.79 Developments of October 
1998 were sensational: the president and the parliament finally reached an agreement only to see 
their candidate for prime minister, Sanjaasuren Zorig, murdered that same night in his Ulaanbaator 
apartment. Conspiracy theories attributed his death to corruption or alternatively to the corrupt 
officials' fear of being exposed and even to the Russian mafia.80  
The new prime minister was finally appointed on December 9, 1998. However, Janlavin 
Narantsatsralt, formerly mayor of Ulaanbaatar, did not stay in power for long. He was dismissed in 
July 1999 over the proposed privatization of Russian state interests in the country's largest copper 
mine, Erdenet. Rinchinnyamiyn Amarjargal was approved as the country's 20th prime minister on 
July 30, 1999.  
The government crisis exposed the constitutional weakness of Mongolia's political system, where 
neither the parliament nor the president have the ability to single-handedly dictate policy but each 
have enough power to obstruct the other's actions.  
Political and Human Rights  
Mongolia seems to have embraced democracy and to allow free speech. There are many private 
newspapers, a television station, and several radio stations that express views from all over the 
political spectrum. Foreign satellite and cable broadcasts are also available. Many NGOs are 
flourishing. The country has 18 registered parties that represent all different walks of life. Freedom 
of religion is respected and over the past nine years Mongolia has witnessed a Buddhist 
renaissance throughout the country.  
Social conditions81  
Khalkha Mongols constitute 90 percent of the population, Kazakhs 4 percent; Russians and 
Chinese constitute about 2 percent of the population each. 37 percent of the population are 
under15 years of age and 4 percent are over 65. Between 1989 and 1999 the crude birth rate per 1000 population fell from 37 to 21. The population growth rate in 1998 was 1.9 percent.82 Life 
expectancy at birth is 59.4 years and 63.61 years for females. Between 1960 and 1990, life 
expectancy increased from 47 to 62.  
Between 1992 and 1998, as proportion of GDP, government spending on health, education, and 
social security continued to drop--from 16.2 to 14.8 percent. The government developed a 
comprehensive social assistance program in 1996, and a new pension system in 1995. The 
existing system of health insurance now covers about 90 percent of the population. However, 
according to the Gini coefficient measure, the inequality between the rich and the poor is on the 
rise.  
There is one physician for every 411 people and 78 beds per 10,000 people. In 1998 infant 
mortality (per 1,000 live births) was 52, which is much higher than the similar indicator for East Asia 
and the Pacific (37) but lower than among the low-income countries (69). However, twelve percent 
of children were malnourished.83 Between 1990 and 1995 the number of primary schools fell from 
96 to 79 and the overall enrollment ratio for children aged 8 to 15 fell from 98 to 84 percent. By 
1998 enrollment reached 87 percent. Gross primary enrollment as percent of the school- age 
population was higher for women (91 percent) than for men (86 percent).84 According to the UN 
statistics, in 1996 expected number of formal schooling was 7.7. In 1998, 96 percent of the 
population were literate; around 85 percent of women were working.  
The percent of population that live below the poverty line has decreased between 1995 and 1998 
from 36.3 percent to 35.6 percent. The situation, however, worsened in urban areas where there is 
an increase from 38.5 percent in 1995 to 39.4 percent in 1998, while in rural areas the number 
decreased from 33.1 percent to 32.6 percent. Mongolia is a relatively urbanized country with 62 
percent of population living in cities and towns.85 80 percent of rural households do not have 
electricity. In 1996, 68 percent of rural population had access to safe water and 54 percent to 
adequate sanitation.  
STATES THAT HAVE EXPERIENCED A DECLINE IN ECONOMIC AND POLTICAL RIGHTS 
UZBEKISTAN  
Summary: Uzbekistan is a good example of a state in which there has been a reversal of 
economic, social, civil and political rights. There is no question that political and civil rights have 
come under threat and been curtailed in Uzbekistan in recent years, and that economic reforms 
have been introduced quite slowly, and without significantly expanding the economic rights of the 
population. At the same time, Uzbekistan has worked hard to maintain a wide range of social 
welfare benefits, and the government has often used its commitment to this goal as a partial 
explanation for way economic reforms are being held up. The threat of domestic extremist groups 
is the other frequently given explanation for why political rights must be restricted as well.  
The main question is whether the current situation is a stable one, whether the current social levels 
and political controls can be maintained in the absence of systemic economic reforms.  
*** In December 1991 Islam Karimov was elected president of Uzbekistan in what was a "Soviet style 
election" in which to borrow from Stalin's famous saying "it did not matter who voted, it only 
mattered who counted the votes." He received 86 percent of the vote, while his opponent 
Muhammad Salih received 12 percent in the election that was almost universally considered unfair 
and not free. President Karimov has avoided elections in 1996 and extended his term in office by 
four years, until 2000, by a popular referendum in March 1995.  
Economic Situation:  
Uzbekistan had adopted the slowest and the most gradual approach to market reforms. In fact, 
Karimov once greatly admired the Chinese model and suggested that Uzbekistan should follow a 
similar path. However, his statement on the matter caused an outrage across the political spectrum 
and the President was forced to retract it. Uzbekistan's economic transformation is based on five 
basic principles: economy takes priority over politics; the state is the principal reformer and 
guarantor of economic transformation; supremacy of law in all spheres of activity; the state has to 
raise public welfare and it is one of its main functions during transition to a market economy; and 
economic reforms should be implemented consistently but gradually.86  
Uzbekistan has seen the smallest decline in its GDP since independence among the CIS states. 
The 1999 GDP shows only a 9 percent decline from 1991. Such a remarkable situation is a result 
of an extensive government control over the economy. It is one of the few countries in the region 
that still has exchange rate controls, severe currency restrictions, including a ban on foreign 
currency operations within the country. As a result, a black market for US dollar is thriving.  
The country is largely isolated from the global financial system. The growth of industrial output is 
largely due to the activities of DAEWOO, the Korean firm that in June 1996 opened a $1.2 billion 
auto plant with the Uzbek partners and the new Tico, Nexia, and Damas cars are quite popular in 
the country. However, since the introduction of the fixed exchange rate and a thriving black market 
for US dollar, the company raised its rates and became less competitive. Samsung Electronics has 
suspended indefinitely the production of household appliances in Uzbekistan due to problems 
arising from non-convertibility of the Uzbek som.87 Uzbekistan's crisis is so severe that the 
government in Tashkent maintains that in 2000 it will finally make the som freely convertible, in the 
hopes of attracting foreign investment and as part of an effort to receive an international financial 
rescue plan. The IMF created a $185 million stand-by facility for Uzbekistan in December 1995, but 
it was suspended in November 1996 when the Uzbek government failed to support the flaying som.  
Things, though, could have been worse. Uzbekistan is the only CIS state that has considerably 
increased its oil and gas production since gaining independence. Starting 1995 the country 
became a net oil exporter. Uzbekistan is currently the fourth largest oil producer in the post-Soviet 
space.88 Since 1994 Uzbekistan surpassed Turkmenistan to become a leading producer of gas in 
the post-Soviet space, second only to Russia.89 It supplies gas to southern Kyrgyzstan, southern 
Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan is in a position to get concessions from the neighboring 
countries by threatening to or actually stopping gas deliveries, as it did in 1998 to Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan, which have run up substantial debts.  
Uzbekistan remains an agricultural producer. During the Soviet period, cotton was truly a 
monoculture and excessive cultivation and irrigation led not only to economic imbalances but also to deterioration of land and to an environmental disaster at the Aral sea. In 1998 agriculture 
accounted for 26.4 percent of GDP, industry for 15 percent, construction for 7.8 percent, services 
for 35.3 percent, net taxes for 15.5 percent.90 Uzbekistan remains the world's fifth largest producer 
of cotton with an ability to affect the world price. A new land code was introduced in July 1998 and 
though all land remained in the hands of the state, Uzbek citizens engaged in agriculture or wishing 
to construct a private house were allowed to lease plots. This gave a boost to the agricultural 
sector and in 1999 Uzbekistan harvested about 2.5 million tons of grain from 905 hectares. 
However, farmers have continued to be forced to sell 95 percent of the crop to the state and the 
government has not paid the debts for years. According to estimates, Uzbekistan needs over 4 
million of grain to satisfy domestic demand. The US Department of agriculture estimates that in 
1998 Uzbekistan imported about 650,000 tons of grain, mainly from Kazakhstan and Europe.91  
Some steps have been made towards privatization. In October 1992 the country introduced 
privatization of small-scale enterprises. In 1994, privatization of medium-size enterprises began, 
including light industrial and manufacturing enterprises. However, the state retained up to 26 
percent stake at those enterprises.92 However, when the small-scale privatization program was 
winding down by the end of 1996, less than 20 per cent of medium and large enterprises have 
been transferred to the private sector. In 1998 private sector accounted for 45 percent of GDP.93 
The government is concerned that "excessive" privatization would lead to increased unemployment 
and social tensions. However, it is beginning to realize the need for privatization. The state 
privatization program for 1999-2000 envisions sale of 159 medium and large firms; divestiture of 69 
medium sized companies; and sale of 25-50 percent stake in the largest 30 firms. However, the 
government still has no plans to privatize the energy sector.94  
Uzbekistan is desperately trying to attract foreign investment. President Karimov's degree in April 
1998 lowers the amount of charter capital from $300,000 to $150,000.95 In May 1998 Uzbekistan 
introduced a new program that granted foreign investors a seven-year profit tax holiday and 
exempted them from import tariffs on equipment for their ventures. However, foreign investment 
remains low. As noted, the IMF suspended the loans to the country in 1996 since Uzbekistan was 
not compliant with its conditionality. In 1998 the EBRD publicly questioned the extent of its 
involvement in the country that established new exchange controls and introduced other 
impediments to foreign activity. Lack of funds slows modernization of the economy, which 
elsewhere is being largely financed by foreign capital. Left to its own devices much of the industry 
would remain non-competitive and would be able to survive largely due to soft budget constraints 
and restrictions on foreign competitors. Currently industrial production accounts for 19 percent of 
GDP and employs 13.5 percent of the population.96 In search for new partners the country is 
turning to its large neighbor to the east. In November 1999 China agreed to advance an $11 million 
loan to Uzbekistan.  
Political Life: National Idea and Outlook for the Future:  
President Karimov has stated on several occasions that a strong hand is needed to preserve 
stability, and that this goal is paramount, more important than political reform or the protection of 
human rights. To help advance this Karimov sponsored the development of a national idea based 
on the legacy of Amir Timur (Tamerlane), a 14th century Mongol conqueror, who was made into a 
national hero with a lavish museum in Central Tashkent as well as with numerous monuments 
throughout the country.  Sharaf Rashidov, head of the Communist Party of Soviet Uzbekistan for 24 years (and candidate 
Politburo member) has been made into a "smaller scale" national hero. In order to make people 
believe that Uzbekistan is a nation with a great future, Karimov has sough to prove to the world that 
his is a nation with a great past. This campaign is consolidating the nation. If earlier, citizens of the 
country considered themselves members of either Samarkand (Samarkand-Bukhara), Tashkent, 
Ferghana or Kashkadaryin clans and identified primarily with regions, today more and more people 
identify themselves with the country first, and then with their region, clan, or nationality. Uzbek is 
the state language and it is spoken by 75 percent of the population. As part of the language reform 
the script is to be switched from Cyrillic to Latin. However, the original deadline set for September 
2000 was moved to September 2005.  
Uzbekistan is one of the few post-Soviet states that has not gone through a series of constitutional 
stages, and almost immediately created a presidential state.97 The country's constitution was 
adopted on December 8, 1992 and it provided the president with extraordinary powers. The 
president of the republic is also the chairman of the cabinet of ministers and has the right to 
appoint and dismiss the cabinet ministers, the Chairman of the Board of the Central Bank, high 
command of the armed forces, governors, and judges of regional, district, city, and commercial 
courts. He can form and abolish ministries, state committees, and other state management 
agencies, subject to subsequent parliamentary approval. The President issues decrees, 
resolutions, and orders that become laws of the country. The president may disband the 
parliament. The Constitution does not provide for an impeachment procedures. Chapter 7 
guarantees basic human rights however, most of them have the "unless otherwise envisioned by 
law" clauses.  
In January 2000, Uzbekistan held presidential elections. The voter turnout was 95.1 percent and 
incumbent Islam Karimov was reelected with 91.9 percent of the vote. His only opponent, 
philosophy professor Abdulkhafiz Djalalov, received 4.17 percent. United States condemned the 
poll for it was "neither free nor fair," adding that voters were offered "no real choice" and opposition 
parties were not permitted to register or nominate presidential candidates.98  
Political process: The President's almost absolute power manifests itself in all areas of life. It is 
rather common for authorities to arbitrarily detain and arrest people, to fail to release prisoners 
upon completion of sentences, to plant evidence and physically abuse detainees, to violate the 
right of freedom of association, to close mosques and Islamic schools, to arbitrary dismiss Islamic 
teachers and expel Muslim students, to force men to shave off beards, and to intimidate their 
families. Human rights observers suspect that the state also sponsored "disappearances" of its 
political opponents. Certainly it is hard to believe that it is coincidental that the younger brother of 
exiled Uzbek opposition leader (and former presidential candidate) Muhammad Solih simply 
disappeared while in state custody. The Human Rights Watch has confirmed his disappearance. 
Other prisoners complained that torture methods included electric shocks, beatings with batons 
and plastic bottles filled with water, and the use of the "bag of death," a plastic bag used to 
temporarily suffocate victims.  
At the same time the constitution tries to create the impression that the country is a parliamentary 
democracy, because it mandates the creation of a multi-party political system, without providing for 
any of the legal guarantees necessary to insure that the country has a free, open and competitive political system. Article 77 of the Constitution stipulates that the parliament of Uzbekistan (Oliy 
Majlis) is elected from territorial electoral districts in multi-party elections for a term of five years.  
Two parties -- the People's Democratic Party (PDP) and Vatan Tarakkiyeti (the Progress of 
Fatherland) contested the elections held in December 1994. The PDP is the country's largest party 
and is headed by President Karimov. It is the successor to the Communist Party and is the 
country's first officially registered party. Vatan Tarakkiyeti (the Progress of Fatherland) became a 
second official party in the country and was founded by Usman Azimov, Karimov's Advisor on 
Problems of Youth, prior to the parliamentary elections in order to ensure the multi-party element 
mandated by the Constitution. Leaders of the democratic party Erk, the Communist Workers party, 
the people's movement Birlik, and the society for Human Rights have been forced to leave the 
country prior to the elections. As a result, Karimov received a 250-member parliament that is loyal 
to the President.  
To boost the "multi-party" element Adolat (Justice) Social Democratic Party was created just days 
before the parliament's opening session. Since candidates for parliament are appointed either by 
officially registered parties or by regional legislative parties, whose heads are appointed by the 
president, until there is systemic political change, elections will inevitably produce a parliament that 
is pro-presidential. There are also Xalq Birligi (People's Unity) Social movement and the Milliy 
Tiklanish (National Revival) Democratic Party.  
The programs of all the legally registered parties are largely identical and are similar to Karimov's 
rhetoric of building a democratic and secular Uzbekistan. None of the opposition parties are 
officially registered. For example, Birlik popular movement and Erk political party, its more radical 
element that later became independent, have been established and officially registered prior to 
Uzbekistan's independence. However, in 1993 all parties were mandated to re-register. Birlik was 
denied registration and Erk did not even submit documents by claiming the unconstitutionality of re-
registration.  
The latest parliamentary elections were held in December 1999. On November 23, the OSCE 
announced that it will send only a limited number of observers to the upcoming parliamentary 
elections since it is a priori clear that they will be unfair and not free.99 Not surprisingly, the Central 
Electoral Commission of Uzbekistan declared elections valid and reported a 95 percent voter 
turnout in the first round and over 87 percent in the second round. People's Democratic Party of 
Uzbekistan received 48 seats, Vatan Tarakkiyeti 20 seats, Adolat 11 seats, Millyi Tiklanish 10 
seats, Fidokorlar 34 seats, local authorities 110 seats, and initiative groups 16 seats.100 It is 
obvious that the newly elected parliament will be as compliant as the previous one.  
Freedom of speech:  
Many of the opposition groups publications are banned outright. Even independent music radio 
stations were taken off the air unexpectedly in early 1998. In 1999 Reporters Sans Frontiers 
named Uzbekistan among 45 countries worldwide that control access and censure websites, 
though it was not among the worst offenders.101 It is rather easy to start an investigation into a 
person's activities. According to article 159 of the criminal code, which punishes anti-state activity, 
two witnesses to a private conversation are sufficient for beginning inquiry. In a true Soviet tradition 
citizens are routinely required to fill out special questionnaires and provide information on the residence permits, the existence of relatives overseas, and so on. Article 67 of the Constitution 
bans censorship of mass media. However, there is no free and independent media in Uzbekistan 
and the State Control Inspectorate censors all press materials.  
Freedom of Religion, Islamic Extremism, and Security Concerns:  
The Uzbek government has identified the risk of religious extremism as its most serious security 
concern. As a result it offered a harsh Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious 
Organizations, which was adopted by the Supreme Council on May 1, 1998. In many respects this 
legislation is harsher than Soviet-era restrictions, and those were the products of an atheistic state, 
whereas the Uzbek government claims pride in its Islamic heritage. For example, article 5 prohibits 
all missionary activities; penalties range from a fine (50 to 100 times the minimum monthly wage) 
to three years of imprisonment. The law bans political parties and movements that are formed 
along religious lines, as well as use of religion to conduct anti-state propaganda. The law also 
prohibits private teaching of religious principles. Article 14 forbids non-clerics from wearing "ritual" 
attire in public, punishable by a fine of five to ten times the amount of the minimum monthly wage 
or by administrative arrest for up to fifteen days. Under the law, religious groups face excessively 
burdensome registration requirements: for example, they must have at least a hundred members 
who are citizens of Uzbekistan and are over the age of 18. The law, together with amendments to 
the criminal code, sets out penalties of up to five years of imprisonment for religious leaders who 
fail to register their groups and for those who participate actively in a prohibited religious group. 
Article 12 of the Constitution specifically forbids any ideology to be established as a state ideology. 
President Karimov frequently uses that to justify his intolerance of various religious groups. The 
government Qanoat Center reviews all religious literature and video and audiotapes and has to 
approve them for distribution.  
The Ferghana valley continues to be a source of instability and to pose a security threat. It does 
have a history of ethnic violence. In 1989 rioting broke out between Uzbeks and the local 
Mesketian Turk population, resulting in more than 100 deaths. In 1990, Kyrgyz and Uzbeks 
clashed over housing and land rights in the Osh valley in Kyrgyzstan, leaving more than 200 dead 
and several hundred injured. December 1997 unrest in Namangan left several policemen dead, 
one of them decapitated. The latter even led to a crackdown that included mass arrests, and public 
trials of Islamic fundamentalists or so-called Wahhabis who were believed to be responsible for the 
massacre. Those arrested were generally charged with possession of narcotics and ammunition. 
The use of this tactic allows the government to say that there are no prisoners of consciousness in 
the country.  
The campaign against religious activists became more severe after a series of blasts shook central 
Tashkent on February 16, 1999. Uzbekistan repeatedly accused Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and 
Chechnya of sponsoring training camps for Islamic fundamentalists who they believe were behind 
the explosions. According to president Karimov "Such people [Islamic fundamentalists or guerillas] 
must be shot in the head. If necessary, I'll shoot them myself."102  
Uzbekistan is struggling to find a workable formula with which to try and accommodate its Islamic 
heritage. In March 1999, Karimov declared that "the Uzbek nation will never turn away from the 
religion of Islam. But Islam should not be raised to the political plane in our country. Uzbekistan 
shall remain a secular state. The conditions and environment for extremism, terrorism, and communal strife do not exist in Uzbekistan. Islamic extremists and religious fanaticism are 
operating from without, against the Uzbek nation and against the changes that are now taking 
place in our state." Olivier Roy has observed that "an authentic, national and moderate Islam was 
proposed as a bulwark against radical ideologies imported from abroad." 103 On the one hand, in 
June 1999 police arrested children aged 9-12 for allegedly spreading leaflets propagating 
fundamentalist Islam and calling for the overthrow of President Islam Karimov.104 On the other, in 
September 1999, at the opening ceremony of the Tashkent Islamic University, Karimov said that 
the university will teach the history and philosophy of Islam, Islamic law, economy, and natural 
sciences, noting that instruction will be based "on original sources handed down from [our] 
ancestors."105  
There can be no question, though, where the emphasis of government policy is. At the time that 
this small Islamic university was opened, the government was also closing down all mosques that 
lacked official registration, which has resulted in the closure of some 80 percent of the country's 
mosques. Prior to this, in January 1998, the Muslim Board of Uzbekistan had ordered the removal 
of all loudspeakers and microphones from the country mosques. Once again, though, in a show of 
government support for Islam, Uzbeks have been allowed to make pilgrimage to Mecca and have 
even been flown to Saudi Arabia on Air Uzbekistan. But potential pilgrims are subjected to rigorous 
scrutiny, and it is said that they are even tested for their knowledge of Karimov's work when they 
completing various papers for to be considered for a hajj.  
Uzbekistan is also worried that developments in Afghanistan create new risks of political instability, 
encourage the rise of religious fundamentalism, and stimulate trafficking of drugs and weapons. 
President Karimov has played an active role in negotiating peace accords. However, he recognizes 
that there is no guarantee that Taliban forces will not launch a northbound campaign. The situation 
in Afghanistan heightens tensions between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as Tashkent views 
Tajikistan as particularly vulnerable to ethnic appeals as well as the general criminalization of 
society which appears to emanate from Afghanistan. For their part, Tajiks remain suspicious of 
Uzbeks and tend to view Uzbek behavior as conspiratorial in origin.106  
Karimov's rhetoric gives them further grounds for concern, as do his actions. President Karimov 
has promised to use any means possible to alleviate the terrorist threat in Uzbekistan, even if it 
involves bombing territory of sovereign states. Since he believes that most of the guerrillas active 
in Uzbekistan are able to hide in Tajikistan (and that some are ethnic Tajiks), who have been 
trained in Afghanistan, he feels he has a right to bomb the Tajik territory.107 When the forces of 
Djuma Namangani, moved from Tajikistan to Kyrgyzstan (in part because of exerted by the Uzbeks 
on the Tajiks) Karimov ordered the Uzbek Air Force to bomb their strong-holds in Kyrgyzstan as 
well, which risked provoking a diplomatic incident when a peaceful Kyrgyz village was mistaken for 
the rebel strong-hold. Informed Tajik sources also strongly believe that the Uzbeks aided Colonel 
Mahmud Khudoiberdiev, who sought to seize power in Khujand oblast in November 1998, and then 
it is alleged that they provided him with safe passage or asylum, when his coup attempt failed.  
Karimov was also successful at convincing other countries to extradite suspects back to 
Uzbekistan. On April 9, 1999 in Moscow the police arrested Makhmuddzhan Khadzhiyev, a citizen 
of Russia and a member of the Birlik popular movement. He was extradited to Uzbekistan on the 
grounds that he was wanted in Namangan. In general, Uzbekistan is seeking closer cooperation with Russia in the area of security and in December 1999, the two countries signed a treaty on 
further cooperation between their military. In return for Russian military support, Uzbekistan is a 
strong supporter of Moscow's Chechnya campaign.  
Ethnic composition: Demography offers part of the explanation for why the Uzbek's are committed 
to their policy of national consolidation, and the concomitant concentration of state power. Uzbeks 
account for 80 percent of the population, Russians for 5.5 percent, Tajiks for 5 percent, Kazakh for 
3 percent; Karakalpak and Tatar for 2.5 percent each, and other nationalities account for 2.5 
percent. Uzbekistan is not a party to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol. Over 
the last nine years net migration remained negative with peaks in 1990 and 1994. Emigration was 
directed to Russia and immigration was mainly from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 
Turkmenistan.  
Social conditions:  
From the onset the Uzbek leadership has been cognizant of the fact that the success of their 
political strategy requires that the state insures that the social welfare obligations due to ordinary 
citizens are being satisfactorily met.  
To this end President Karimov declared 1999 "The Year of Women" and women became entitled to 
additional benefits under the new laws on social protection that came into effect in 1999. In mid-
1998 the country's population was 24.1 million people with 23.3 births and 5.9 deaths per 1,000 
population. If growth continues at the current rate the country's population would double in 35 
years. In 1998 life expectancy at birth was 66 year for males and 72 years for females.  
Almost two-thirds of the population live in the country's rural areas. 41 percent of the population is 
under fifteen years old. Over the last five years the share of the working age population in total 
population increased by 1.6 percent and now is approximately 51 percent. As a result, despite a 
4.1 percent annual increase in total employment over the past four years, the ratio of employed 
people to total working age population dropped from 76.4 percent in 1994 to 72.5 percent in 
1998.108 According to official statistics, more than 107,000 people were looking for jobs during the 
second quarter of 1999 and this is a 22.8 percent increase over the same period of 1998. However, 
official unemployment rate in the country is reported to be about 0.7 percent. This is probably an 
inaccurate estimate and the actual unemployment rate is higher, possibly 5.3 percent. Some 
estimates place it at 5.3 percent.109 According to some estimates 80 percent of the population is 
living below the poverty line.  
This situation is not a reassuring one from the point of view of the Uzbek regime, and it makes it 
highly unlikely that they will consider any sort of serious political liberalization in the foreseeable 
future. If anything repression of dissident secular and religious groups is likely to further increase.  
TURKMENISTAN  
Turkmenistan is a country of vast natural resources that the Soviet Union was systematically, but 
not exhaustively exploited. In this regard, Turkmenistan served as a traditional colonial outpost 
providing raw materials to the metropol. Turkmenistan was the second largest producer of cotton in 
the former Soviet Union and the tenth largest producer in the world, but by 1993 only about four 
percent of the cotton crop was processed locally. The country is also the world's fourth largest natural gas producer. According to the Soviet data, Turkmenistan's gas reserves are estimated at 
10-14 tcm. In 1996 gas exports accounted for nearly one-third of GDP.110 However, Turkmenistan 
has had great difficulty establishing dependable and transit routes for its gas, and so profits in this 
sector continue to be much smaller than anticipated. Despite this the government has been able to 
keep much of the social welfare net intact, in part by failing to move forward with comprehensive 
economic reforms. It further keeps the population in check through the institution of an autocratic 




The country's territory of 488,000 square kilometers is slightly larger than that of California. 
However, 80 percent of it is covered by the Karakum desert.  
Turkmenistan's abundant natural resources offer the prospect of prosperity and hard currency 
revenue but so far the Turkmen have had difficulty realizing these goals. During the late 1980s, the 
country exported 90 billion cubic meters of gas a year through Russian pipelines to the rest of the 
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
however, as an independent country Turkmenistan lacks direct access to foreign consumers, and 
in particular it found itself at Russia's mercy.  
As a result, Turkmen exports fell to 77 bcf in 1998 from 2.4 tcf in 1987.111 This affected the 
country's economy for 70 percent of hard currency revenue is from export of gas and up to 60 
percent of the budget is formed based on this revenue.  
Moscow was quick and forceful in the use of its advantage. In 1993 Moscow cut the country's 
access to potential paying customers in Central and Western Europe and redirected its gas to 
poverty-stricken Ukraine and the states of the Transcaucasus. As a result, the Turkmenistan's gas 
exports declined considerably. In addition, the country was not paid for what it did deliver and by 
1997 Ukraine accumulated a $1.5 billion debt to Turkmenistan. Gas deliveries to Ukraine were 
halted in 1997, then resumed in early 1999 but were halted again in June 1999 and Turkmenistan 
is threatening to go to court to settle the debt. As of August 12, 1999 Ukraine paid for less than ten 
percent of deliveries, owing Turkmenistan more than $665 million.112 Georgia's debt was about 
$374 million, and Azerbaijan's $56 million.113  
Turkmen access to these customers (which the government in Ashgabat was also reluctant to 
service) was cut off in March 1997, when Gazprom denied Turkmenistan access to the pipelines. 
This was in retaliation for an earlier decision by President Niyazov to suspend a Russian-Turkmen 
gas venture. The Turkmen feared that Moscow was using the venture as yet another way to 
monopolize gas exports in the region. Their official explanation for terminating the venture was a 
pricing dispute over the purchase price for Turkmen gas that traveled along the Russian pipeline 
route. This dispute continued into early 1999, when access to the pipelines was granted again. 
Even now, though, the transportation prices that Gazprom charges are so high that Turkmenistan 
can barely make money on the exports.  
Turkmenistan is desperate to find alternative routes. In December 1997 a 200-kilometer pipeline 
was completed that connected it to Iran. However, with a capacity of four bcm a year it is not capable of solving the country's problems. During the April 1998 visit to Washington, President 
Niyazov secured a $750,000 investment into the Trans-Caspian pipeline feasibility study, yet it may 
be many years before this pipeline is actually constructed, for a host of economic as well as 
political reasons. Political conditions (this time the situation in Afghanistan) crippled another 
potential gas pipeline project. In December 1998 Unocal withdrew from a project to build a 1,271-
kilometer gas export pipeline to Pakistan via Afghanistan. Despite that, in April 1999 Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, and Turkmenistan signed an agreement to expedite the start of the project, which is 
now being constructed under the auspices of the remaining members of the CENTGAS 
consortium.114 In May 1999 Turkmenistan signed an agreement with Turkey to transport natural 
gas, but this project is also unlikely to be realized for at least another five years.  
Turkmenistan has a tightly controlled government-led economy and President Niyazov micro-
manages it at almost every level. In 1994 the government launched an economic program entitled 
10 Years of Prosperity. The program's goal is to achieve economic independence and prosperity 
through the creation of market economy. However, the goals of the program are not realistic, 
particularly taking into account that in 1998 GDP was just 65 percent of the 1992 level.115 It is very 
difficult to accurately estimate the economy's performance because Turkmenistan's officials are 
increasingly reluctant to provide relevant economic information.  
Privatization has been slow, and by 1996 only 2,000 units had been privatized.116 At the end of 
1996 no large enterprises had been privatized, but in the first half of 1997 a small number of 
companies were sold. The largest sale was that of a 50 per cent stake in the Ashgabat Ice Cream 
Factory, sold to a Turkish investor for US $ 2 million. By mid-1997 the private sector accounted for 
little more than 25 per cent of GDP.117 President Niyazov tried to revive the program in 1997, and 
there has been some increase in foreign investment in the private sector since then. The service 
sector has been privatized. However, constantly changing regulations and tax laws make operation 
difficult for independent entrepreneurs.  
Foreign investment remains limited, and is largely concentrated in projects in which the state is the 
Turkmen partner. In 1994 the World Bank lent the country $25 million to fund the development and 
consolidation of institutions. Two more loans approved in 1997 provided $30.3 million to improve 
water supply and sanitation in the Dashkovuz region and $ 4.2 million to modernize urban transport 
in three cities.118 Since 1992 ten free economic zones have been created and foreign investors 
have been granted special exemptions and tax holidays by the president. However, US foreign 
investment has been low partially because of US restrictions on doing business with Iran, a state 
which enjoys good relations with Turkmenistan, and which serves as a logical transit point.  
The economy was aided somewhat by the government's tight monetary policy, which is responsible 
for curbing inflation to 19.8 percent in 1998 from over 1,700 percent in 1994.  
Agriculture accounts for nearly half of the country's GDP and employs more than two-fifths of the 
labor force. Turkmenistan implemented reforms in the agricultural sector. A 1996 land reform 
allowed private ownership of land, and during the first half of 1997 almost all arable land was 
allocated to private farmers. In 1999 Turkmenistan posted a record grain harvest of 1.5 million 
tons, which exceeds the original target and satisfies domestic grain requirement.119 The 1999 
cotton harvest represents at least a 35% increase over the same period last year.  In May 1999 a draft government program was unveiled in which per capita GDP is projected to 
reach $7,500 by 2005 and $15,000 by 2010.120 However, this largely depends on the country's 
ability to get its natural resources to foreign consumers.  
Political developments:  
Saparmurad Niyazov was been in charge of Turkmenistan since 1985, when he was appointed 
head of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan. He also took over the post of Chairman of the 
Turkmen Supreme Soviet, and then created the post of president of the republic. He became 
president of the sovereign state of Turkmenistan when the country declared independence in 
October 1991. In June 1992 he ran unopposed for president, and once victorious awarded himself 
a title of Turkmenbashi (Leader of All Turkmens). The new Constitution was adopted in May 1992. 
The Constitution stresses the country's neutrality, and in December 1995 the United Nations 
General Assembly recognized this status after 185 countries passed a relevant resolution.  
The 1992 constitution has created a new parliamentary structure that consists of two chambers: 
the Majlis (Assembly) and the Halk Maslakaly (People's Council). The Majlis has 50 members 
elected by majority vote from single-seat districts and the People's Council includes those as well 
as 50 directly elected 'people's advisors' plus executive and judicial officials. The president chairs 
the Council. All parliament members elected during the December 1994 elections belong to the 
Democratic party of Turkmenistan, which is the successor of the Communist party and the 
country's only official party. The parliament is subordinate to the executive branch and president 
makes all decisions. The latest parliamentary elections took place on December 12, 1999 with 
reported turnout of 98.9 percent. The OSCE did not send any observers to Turkmenistan since the 
preparations for elections did "not meet minimal OSCE commitments for democratic elections." The 
United States stated that the elections were further evidence of "the increased degree of 
governmental control and repression that has been instituted in Turkmenistan in recent months" 
and "an unwelcome indication of Turkmenistan's continuing disregard for international norms."  
The January 1994 referendum confirmed the December 1993 parliamentary decision and extended 
the president's term in office until 2002. According to article 75 of the Constitution, the president is 
also chairman of the cabinet of ministers. The president has absolute power and has indeed 
established a personality cult. He has banned opposition parties, tightly controls media, and closely 
monitors the location and movement of foreigners. In 1999 Turkmenistan introduced strict visa 
requirements for foreign citizens, including those of the other CIS countries.  
Turkmenbashi has a city, an airport, numerous streets and even yogurts, not to mention a French 
perfume named after him. The country is "decorated" with gigantic posters of the leader who lives 
in a $80 million palace adjourned by beautiful fountains.  
The 'Turkmen's Oath' that swears allegiance to the motherland, the president, and the holy banner 
has been made compulsory at the beginning of all public meetings. A golden forty-foot statue of the 
president stands atop the Arch of Neutrality, a national symbol erected in 1999 in downtown 
Ashgabat and Turkmenbashi, his hand held out to his people, rotates to face the sun  
There are virtually no means for sponsoring democratic change in Turkmenistan. The country does 
not have independent press or media. Libel is a criminal offense punishable by either a fine or by 
up to two years of forced labor and a reporter can get up to five years prison sentence for the same 
charge.121 Opposition political parties are banned. There is no freedom of speech, assembly, or expression. The only positive move in the area of human rights was the January 1999 introduction 
of a moratorium on death penalty by president Niyazov. This has been subsequently approved by 
Halk Maslakaly and made into a constitutional amendment.  
Social Conditions:  
Turkmenistan's population is 4.4 million. Turkmen comprise 73 percent, Russian 6.7 percent, 
Uzbek 9 percent, Kazakh 2 percent, and others 6 percent. The population is 45 percent urban. 
Turkmen is the official language and is spoken by 75 percent of the population.  
Population growth rate is 2 percent per year. Average population age is 23 years; 43 percent of 
population are younger than 15 years and 10 percent of the population are over 65. Between 1980 
and 1996 life expectancy increased from 64 to 66 years, infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) 
decreased from 54 to 41, adult male mortality decreased from 263 to 250 and adult female 
mortality from 154 to 122.122  
In 1979, 1,000 employed had to support 1,187 unemployed, by 1995 the latter number increased to 
1,287. In 1997, only 37 percent of the population were employed (38 per cent of these were 
employed in agriculture, 22 per cent in industry and 40 per cent in services). In 1998 the retirement 
age for women was raised from 55 to 57 and for men from 60 to 62. However, income distribution 
was more equal than in other countries. For example, in 1997 the ratio between the richest and 
poorest deciles in Turkmenistan equaled 5, whereas in Russia it equaled 13. However, it has been 
estimated that 48 percent of the population live in poverty.123  
The existing social safety net experiences problems yet remains functioning. Though the 
government curtailed expenditures on wages, pensions, stipends, and medicines to keep the 
budget deficit under control, housing and utilities are provided by the state free of charge and key 
consumer goods remain heavily subsidized. Turkmenistan has abolished the ten-year secondary 
education and introduced nine-year secondary education (instead of the previously existing ten-
year). The country's healthcare system has received government funding and the number of 
physicians increased from 2.9 per 1,000 people in 1980 to 3.2 in 1994. The number of hospital 
beds also increased from 10.6 in 1980 to 11.5 in 1994.124 At the same time the country is 
witnessing a severe shortage of medicines and equipment. China granted Turkmenistan a US $ 6 
million credit to purchase medicines in January 1996. In 1995, 85 percent of the population had 
access to safe drinking water, 60 percent had access to sanitation.  
A STATE THAT DEFIES CLASSIFICATION 
TAJIKISTAN  
The Tajiks can be considered Central Asia's oldest nationality, as they represent a stable ethnic 
formation that dates back over two and a half thousand years to the region's earliest Indo-
European population. Out of 1.1 million Tajiks in 1929, only 300,000 were included within the 
Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan, over time more of them moved from Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan into Tajikistan, so that at the time of last Soviet census in 1989 the republic was 65 
percent Tajik. The country has had an unfortunate history since independence, including five years 
of civil war, which though formally ended has still not left the government in firm control of all parts 
of the country.  Economy:  
In real terms the economy has shrunk by approximately 65 percent since 1991. Complete 
devastation of the economy is illustrated by the fact that in 1996 Regar aluminum smelter at 
Tursun-Zade accounted for over 50 percent of the country's exports even as its output was 
declining.125 By mid-1997 private enterprise accounted for just 20-30 percent of GDP. In 1998 more 
than $7.5 million was made on the sale of 1,643 government owned commercial firms and small 
enterprises.126 However, legal protection of private property is weak. In December 1999, President 
Rakhmonov signed a decree on "Measures for Further Development and Enhancing the 
Effectiveness of Economic Reforms." The degree is intended to expedite and expand privatization. 
It also mandates the government to take steps to improve the investment climate and to draft 
legislation on the state treasury and national social security measures to protect the most 
vulnerable groups of the population.  
The country is a significant source of hydroelectric power. Agriculture accounts for nearly one-
quarter of the GDP. Cotton production accounts for approximately two-thirds of the agricultural 
sector.  
Political Developments  
Tajikistan declared independence in September 1991. In November 1991, Rakhmon Nabiev won 
the first presidential elections. Regional rivalries have marked the country's political life. Violent 
clashes began in March 1992 and in September Nabiev was forced to resign. The violence turned 
into a full-scale war between supporters of the former Communist hardliners and the United Tajik 
Opposition (UTO), a coalition of Islamic, nationalist, and democratic forces. In December 1992, 
Emomali Rakhmonov was elected president. Beginning December, opposition parties and 
movements are banned and newspapers that supported the previous coalition government and the 
Islamic-democratic forces are closed. The war continued to rage on. On November 6, 1994, 
Emomali Rakhmonov won the presidential elections against Abdumalik Abdullojanov and captured 
58 percent of the vote. The OSCE did not send any observers to the elections since those, who at 
the time were in formal opposition, were not allowed to run. Observers from the CIS, Turkey, Iran 
and Pakistan reported widespread irregularities. Voters also approved the constitution, which 
established a 181-member parliament that is elected for a term of 5 years. The Constitution also 
banned religious based parties. Article 69 of the Constitution allowed the President to appoint and 
dismiss local leaders. The February 1995 local and parliamentary elections were boycotted by the 
UTO after the election commission rejected the candidacy of the former Tajik Prime Minister 
Abdullojanov. In June 1997 the final peace agreement was signed, however, outbreaks of violence 
continued.  
In August 1999 the Tajik Supreme Court finally lifted the ban on opposition parties in a step toward 
implementing the 1997 peace agreement. In September in a nation-wide referendum voter 
approved constitutional amendments that would allow for a creation of a bi-cameral parliament, for 
the extension of the president's term in office from five to seven years, and for a formation of 
religious-based political parties.127 A few days later the Islamic Renaissance Party has been re-
registered. However, by mid- December the Supreme Court has annulled the registration by the 
Justice Ministry of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan (Tehran Platform), the Justice and 
Development and the Renaissance of Tajikistan parties. It has banned the Agrarian Party and the 
Party of National Unity. The Justice Ministry has refused to register the Party of the National 
Movement of Tajikistan.128  The country seemed to be on the right track preparing for the November 1999 presidential 
elections. However, in October the UTO withdrew from the Central Electoral Commission citing 
sabotage of the upcoming elections by local officials and the Commission's inability to ensure free 
and fare elections. Nevertheless, elections took place as scheduled and President Rakhmonov 
was re-elected by capturing almost 97 percent of the vote. 129  
In December 1999 President Rakhmonov signed a decree on "Expanding the Process of 
Democratization of Socio-Political Life in the Republic," which is intended to guarantee political 
pluralism and the free participation of all political parties in elections and in the state administration. 
On December 3, 1999 the government and the opposition reached agreement on election law in 
view of the upcoming parliamentary elections in February 2000. According to the agreement, the 
lower chamber of parliament will consist of 63 deputies and the upper chamber 33 senators.  
Parliamentary elections were held in February-March 2000. The People's Democratic Party of 
Tajikistan received 64.91% of votes and 15 seats in parliament. The Communists received five 
seats with 20.63% of votes. The Islamic Revival Party won 7.31% of votes and two seats in 
parliament. The other parties could not overcome the 5 percent barrier.130  
Social and political: The country has several independent newspapers. However, the government 
dominates the broadcast media. Libel is a criminal offense; however, the charges were not often 
brought because of the widespread self-censorship.  
The country's population is approximately 6 million. In 1991, about 600,000 people were internally 
displaced and another 60,000 fled to Northern Afghanistan as a result of the civil war. 41 percent is 
younger than 15 years and 5 percent are older than 65. Life expectancy at birth is 68 years. Infant 
mortality (per 1,000 live births) is 20. Tajiks account for 65 percent of the population, Uzbeks for 25 
percent. One-third of the population lives in urban areas. The population growth rate in 1998 was 
1.5 percent. An estimated 85 percent of the population live below the poverty line and 69 percent 
have access to safe water. This is one reason why narcotics trade is becoming more pervasive in 
the country.  
LOOKING AHEAD 
All of the states of this region have changed dramatically since the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
including Mongolia, which was never formally a part of the now defunct USSR. While it is still too 
early to definitively assess the changes that have occurred, there is much to be concerned about 
recent trends in virtually every country in the area.  
Not a single state has made steady progress in expanding the political and economic rights of its 
citizens. Several that were showing promise of developing in democratic ways in the first half of the 
decade, have shown a marked pattern of reducing the arenas of political competition. This is most 
specifically true of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Mongolia does not appear to have as sharp a shift 
in political course, but like Kyrgyzstan, it is beset by serious economic problems, and this poses a 
risk that Mongolia's commitment to democratic political reforms may be undermined by a desire of 
the ruling elite to remain in power.  All of the countries of the region have been experiencing economic problems, irrespective of their 
commitment to economic restructuring. This is even true of Kazakhstan, can be considered to have 
made the greatest economic transition. Potentially Kazakhstan has a rich and diverse economy. 
However, some of the problems that the country is experiencing are the result of an incomplete 
systematic macro-economic reform. Some of the difficulties are the result of global and regional 
financial crises, but others are a product of a flagging commitment to reform, and the refusal of the 
ruling elite to attack the problems of corruption, especially among the elite itself. Much of the future 
stability of the country will depend upon the speed of economic recovery, and as the diversity and 
partial restructuring of the economy may be sufficient to provide enough revenue to address the 
country's social service needs.  
Prospect are far more guarded for the region's less wealthy states. Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia, may 
be able to use an expanded popular sense of empowerment to compensate for the greater social 
dislocation that many are experiencing.  
It is far more difficult to be positive about the prospects of the region's more autocratic regimes. 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have both favored the cause of stability over that of economic 
reform. The stability of the regime in each case is focused heavily on the person of the leader. The 
situation in Uzbekistan appears to be much more tenuously balanced that that of Turkmenistan. 
Uzbekistan is a larger and more complex society, with fewer natural resources to fall back on. 
Uzbekistan's fate is also more closely linked to that of Tajikistan, whose political and economic 
systems have yet to be fully reconstructed in the aftermath of its civil war. It is unclear whether the 
political systems of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan will be able to weather the social shocks that 
might be ahead.  
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